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In his third letter on sunspots (December, 1612) 
to Mark Wesler, Galileo Galilei writes “the mod-
ern observations deprive all former writers of any 
authority, since if they had seen what we see, they 
would have judged as we judge”.
Four hundred years have passed since this letter 
was written, but today, more than ever, it is vital 
to continue to observe the Earth and invest our 
resources and capabilities in the development of new 
observation systems and tools capable of analysing 
these data and providing new information.
The Earth is a complex, dynamic system we 
do not yet fully understand. Our existence on the 
planet and our vulnerability to natural hazards is 
controlled by complex mechanisms that are often 
unstable and difﬁcult to interpret. Observing these 
mechanisms and their interactions, to allow recon-
struction of the past and prediction of the Earth’s 
future behaviour, should be a priority for every gov-
ernment.
Earth observations (EO) and information 
– derived from space, airborne, land and marine net-
works – play an essential role in helping to increase 
the resilience of societies to natural hazards. The 
facility to provide decision makers with critical and 
factual data is needed to drive investments to reduce 
underlying disaster risk factors and to make soci-
ety more adaptable to the effects of climate change. 
By using Earth observation data and information, 
societies can enhance the resilience of exposed com-
munities to hazards and, more importantly, can 
improve the response of individuals, urban systems 
and related infrastructures to extreme events.
The Group on Earth Observations (GEO) is 
working to expand the use of satellite imagery and 
surface data to support governments that are devel-
oping sustainable development policies and reducing 
exposure and vulnerability to disaster risks posed 
by natural and human-induced hazards. The GEO 
community is developing decision-support tools and 
applications for the full cycle of disaster manage-
ment, particularly for developing countries, working 
in close collaboration with national space agencies 
through the Committee on Earth Observation 
Satellites (CEOS) – the space coordination arm of 
GEO – to help improve all phases of disaster risk 
management (DRM) on a global basis.
More timely dissemination and use of geospatial 
information from globally coordinated systems to 
monitor, predict, assess risk, provide early warn-
ing, and mitigate and respond to hazards will help 
reduce loss of life and property at the local, national 
and regional level. The disaster risk reduction and 
management challenges facing the global commu-
nity increasingly demand broad and timely access to 
high-quality, integrated and sustained Earth obser-
vation data and related information.
Moreover, Earth observations are owned by 
many entities around the world, and no single 
country is able to acquire the comprehensive data 
and tools it needs to inform policy in these critical 
domains. Speciﬁcally, crisis management resulting 
from high-frequency natural and human-induced 
extreme events requires capacities that generally 
cannot be provided by one country alone; effective 
response requires regional/international collabora-
tion and coordination so that, when such events 
occur, the ﬂow of data from various countries, as 
well as the international organisations in which they 
are represented, works smoothly. This is particularly 
true in the case of extreme hazards, where the poten-
tial effect of an event could have a regional or global 
impact with dramatic consequences on society.
The treatise contained in this Science Position 
Paper raises serious questions about how the current 
and future global population can be better prepared 
for extreme geohazard events and their potentially 
calamitous impacts. As this important discussion 
moves forward, leaders in government, the private 
sector, civil society, and members of the general 
public should take into account the essential con-
tribution of Earth observations to these issues and 
to their eventual outcomes.
Barbara J. Ryan  
Secretariat Director,  
Group on Earth Observations (GEO)
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Natural hazards that occur frequently on our 
dynamic planet are increasingly causing loss 
of human life and damage to goods and infra-
structures at the local, regional and global scale, 
depending on their intensity. The Science Position 
Paper Extreme Geohazards: Reducing the Disaster 
Risk and Increasing Resilience analyses the poten-
tial effects of low-probability high-impact events, 
which might cause global disasters and even bring 
our already stressed global society beyond the limits 
of sustainability.
The initiative that led to the preparation of this 
Science Position Paper originated from the high-
level research conference ‘Understanding Extreme 
Geohazards: The Science of the Disaster Risk 
Management Cycle’ (Sant Feliu de Guixols, Spain, 
27 November–2 December 2011), which was co-
sponsored by the European Science Foundation 
and COST.
The conference gathered a variety of experts, 
including representatives of international organi-
sations such as the United Nations Educational, 
Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
the Integrated Research on Disaster Risk 
(IRDR), the International Union of Geodesy and 
Geophysics (IUGG), the United Nations Ofﬁce 
for Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the Group 
on Earth Observations (GEO), and the Global 
Earthquake Model (GEM) Foundation. The experts 
reviewed the understanding of extreme geohaz-
ards and the how, why, and when of these events. 
Examples and forensic analyses were presented for 
a number of disasters that have occurred in the last 
decades and caused huge loss of human life and cat-
astrophic damage in different regions of the planet.
In the course of the discussions the experts con-
curred on the idea of documenting the main existing 
issues and needs for the future, and identiﬁed the 
Life, Earth and Environmental Sciences (LESC) Unit, 
working under the auspices of the LESC Standing 
Committee (now the Scientiﬁc Review Group for 
Life, Earth and Environmental Sciences, SRG-LEE) 
as the ideal platform to promote this action.
In the course of its preparation and thanks to 
extensive dissemination at specialised international 
conferences and meetings (AGU Science Policy 
Conference 2012, European Geosciences Union 
2013, European Geosciences Union 2014, Global 
Risk Forum 2014, GEORISK 2014) the Science 
Position Paper has gained the attention and input 
of other scientiﬁc experts, thus further expanding 
its content and taking the paper well beyond its 
originally planned Executive Summary format.
The Science Position Paper addresses several 
types of geohazards, but puts special emphasis on 
the mounting risk of catastrophic effects on popu-
lations and infrastructures should our growing 
and increasingly interconnected modern society 
be exposed to a very large volcanic eruption. The 
paper highlights the urgency of establishing an 
effective dialogue with international organisations 
and policy makers in order to develop robust risk 
management, disaster risk reduction, resilience, 
and sustainability plans in the coming years and 
decades. It also underlines the need to develop 
the methodology to assess the potentially global 
impacts that a major hazard would have on our 
modern society, which would provide guidance to 
reduce vulnerability where possible and increase 
general resilience in the face of surprise events. It 
concludes that preparedness requires a global mon-
itoring system that could provide timely warning 
should such a major hazardous event develop.
Professor Dr Hans-Peter Plag 
Professor, Ocean, Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, 
Director, Mitigation and Adaptation Research 
Institute (MARI) Old Dominion University, 
Norfolk, Va, USA
Dr Paola Campus 
European Science Foundation (ESF),  
Senior Science Ofﬁcer in charge of the Scientiﬁc 
Review Group for Life, Earth and Environmental 
Sciences
Professor Dr Reinhart Ceulemans 
Chair of the ESF Scientiﬁc Review Group for Life, 
Earth and Environmental Sciences, SRG-LEE
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I am very pleased that ESF has been able to sup-
port the initiating Conference and the subsequent 
work of the research communities concerned. The 
Position Paper is very timely and addresses key 
issues of hazards, resilience and sustainability 
through the contributions from a range of experts.
I note that Director Ryan introduces her 
Foreword with a reference to Galileo Galilei’s writ-
ing on sunspots and related observations. At our 
current state of development, space and geohazards 
can heavily jeopardise large communities, commu-
nications and resilience. For this reason, our society 
needs a comprehensive and enhanced monitoring 
network with associated rapid response system.
The social elements of the challenges involved 
with Planet Earth have been well outlined in earlier 
ESF reports, notably in the ESF-COST publication 
RESCUE: Responses to Environmental and Societal 
Challenges for our Unstable Earth.
This Science Position Paper is not only aligned 
with the message of RESCUE, but it further 
elaborates concepts related to the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals endorsed at the Rio+20 – United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.
I have no doubt that this Paper will be of interest 
to a large number of stakeholders and will generate 
opportunities for improved collaboration as well as 
concerted actions in the future.
Martin Hynes 
ESF Chief Executive
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•	 Extreme geohazards have the potential to gener-
ate global disasters. 
•	 Recent large earthquakes have illustrated the 
extent of the destruction that extreme geohaz-
ards can inﬂict on a modern society, particularly 
through cascading effects and chains of failure. 
•	 Disaster risk reduction (DRR) focuses on the 
risk associated with relatively frequent hazards 
with major impacts, while the risk associated 
with low-probability, high-impact events is not 
sufficiently considered.
•	 Threats from low-frequency, high-impact events 
are grossly underestimated in DRR. 
•	 This is particularly true for volcanic eruptions. 
So far, modern civilisation has not been exposed 
to an eruption comparable to the most extreme 
events that occurred during the Holocene. 
•	 Under today’s circumstances, these events are 
associated with extreme disaster risks, com-
parable to other possible mega-disasters from 
extreme droughts, ﬂoods, pandemics and aster-
oid impacts. 
•	 A global volcano-monitoring system is required 
as a basis for an early warning system to provide 
timely warnings to mitigate impacts on transpor-
tation and food security.
•	 A cost–beneﬁt analysis shows that on a global 
basis several billion dollars per year should be 
invested to signiﬁcantly reduce the risk associ-
ated with extreme volcanic eruptions. 
•	 Efficient DRR will also require a reduction in 
the vulnerability of infrastructure, an increase 
of general economic and social resilience, and the 
development of capabilities to adapt to poten-
tially large long-term changes in environmental 
conditions. 
•	 A paradigm shift toward integrated DRR and 
Resilience (D3R) programmes could more 
aggressively facilitate the public trust, coopera-
tion, and communication needed to adequately 
prepare for and recover from expected disasters 
as well as ‘ Black Swan’ disasters (low-probability, 
high-consequence events that are difficult to pre-
dict or prevent). 
•	 In D3R, science does not have the primary goal 
of reducing uncertainties and prediction errors 
for hazards, but rather to develop antifragile 
processes and strengthen resilience through 
increased social capital. 
•	 An international process is needed to assess 
repeatedly the global risk associated with 
extreme hazards, including geohazards, and our 
preparedness to cope with these high-impact 
events. 
•	 This process could be an amalgam of the process 
used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, the Quaternary Defense Review carried 
out by the Department of Defense of the USA, 
and the Global Risk assessment carried out by 
the World Economic Forum.
•	 A model-based global simulation of one or more 
extreme volcanic eruptions that took place dur-
ing the Holocene would provide a basis for a 
realistic assessment of the risk and the identiﬁ-
cation of potential cascading effects and chains 
of failure. 
•	 The International Charter on Space and Major 
Disasters should be extended to cover cases of 
emerging threats for early warning purposes 
prior to the occurrence of a disaster.
Summary of Key Findings
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Extreme Hazards: Potential 
Causes of Global Disasters and 
Catastrophes
Humanity is exposed to a broad ensemble of natural 
and anthropogenic hazards that could cause global 
disasters and catastrophes. Efforts in disaster risk 
reduction are challenged by the nature of such 
extreme events: they are rare, occur as surprises, 
and tend to have high impacts. Because they are 
rare, the serious threat posed by extreme events 
tends to be underrated. The increasingly complex 
built environment and global dependencies can lead 
to domino effects amplifying the direct impacts of 
the hazards. Global catastrophes caused by extreme 
natural hazards have the potential to severely 
impact the global economy, food security and sta-
bility. Floods and droughts are major threats that 
potentially could reach a planetary extent through 
secondary economic and social impacts. With 
megacities and crucial industries situated in areas 
exposed to natural hazards, earthquakes, tsunamis, 
and volcanic eruptions might cause disasters that 
could exceed the capacity of the global economy 
to cope. Addressing the challenges that these rare, 
high-impact events pose to human life and prop-
erty is essential for the long-term sustainability of 
civilisation.
Given the nature of these extreme hazards, most 
ideas about them are based on indirect evidence; 
in particular the impacts of the hazards on the 
environment and on society are difficult to assess 
with certainty. Risk as conventionally deﬁned – 
the product of hazard probability, value of assets 
exposed to the hazard, and the vulnerability of the 
assets – is hard to assess. When the hazard prob-
ability is very low, we lack the knowledge to reliably 
estimate vulnerabilities, especially from indirect 
effects, both in the near and far-ﬁeld of the haz-
ardous event.
While the probabilities of most natural hazards 
do not change much over time, the sensitivity of 
the built environment and the embedded socio-eco-
nomic fabric has changed. Exposure to geohazards 
has increased dramatically in recent decades and 
continues to do so. Most of the increasing losses 
occur during less frequent high-impact events at the 
upper end of the hazard spectrum. The increasing 
complexity of societies allows even moderate haz-
ardous events to cause regional and global disasters. 
Understanding the disaster risk therefore requires 
a distinction to be made between the event (the 
occurrence of a hazard) and the processes that are 
triggered by this event and determine its conse-
quences.
Global Disasters and Catastrophes
Risk assessments for extreme hazards require an 
understanding of the processes triggered in the 
complex coupled human–natural system by the 
events that lead, or do not lead, to X-events that are 
rare, surprising, and have potentially huge impact 
on human life. These X-events are outliers outside 
of the ‘normal’ region that could lead to ‘the collapse 
of everything’. Increasingly, the complexity of mod-
ern life ampliﬁes the impacts of natural hazards. 
Although we understand the ‘how’ and ‘why’ for 
most natural hazards events (although not necessar-
ily the ‘when’), how such hazards lead to X-events is 
less well-studied and understood. For many natural 
hazards, the unfolding time is short, but the impact 
time can be much longer. Events that have a short 
unfolding time but large total impacts over very 
long impact times are those that are surprising and 
difficult to prepare for. Extreme geohazards fall into 
this class of event.
Extreme Geohazards
Geohazards such as earthquakes, landslides, 
volcanic eruptions, tsunamis and f loods cause 
signiﬁcant loss of life and property. Most of these 
losses occur during high-impact events and these 
losses are increasing as the number of people who 
live in areas exposed to such hazards continues to 
rise. Recent major geohazards are dwarfed by the 
largest geohazards that occurred several times dur-
ing the Holocene. If such a mega hazard were to 
occur today, the resulting disaster impacts would 
be unparalleled. To increase global resilience and 
reduce the disasters induced by the occurrence of 
Executive Summary
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extreme hazards at an acceptable economic cost 
requires a solid scientific understanding of the 
impacts these hazards could have on modern society. 
Th e extreme earthquakes that occurred during 
the last 2000 years have illustrated the destruc-
tion they can inﬂ ict (Figure 8), both directly and, 
through tsunamis, indirectly. Th e resulting dis-
asters are ampliﬁ ed in areas with poor building 
infrastructure. As a consequence, the earthquakes 
with the largest magnitude are not necessarily those 
that turn out to cause the most fatalities or greatest 
damage. In general, poor countries that are exposed 
to the same level of hazards as more developed 
countries experience a disproportionate number 
of disasters. 
Th e volcanic eruptions in the last few decades 
have oft en resulted in a high ratio of fatalities to 
the immediately impacted population. All but one 
of these eruptions were relatively minor and direct 
impacts were local. For larger volcanic eruptions, 
volcanic ash and gases can induce large indirect 
eff ects that oft en exceed the direct impacts in the 
near-ﬁ eld of the volcano. Th is is illustrated by a 
number of eruptions that have taken place in the 
last few hundred years (Figure 12).
Extreme geohazards that occurred throughout 
the last few thousand years rarely caused major dis-
asters because the population density was low, the 
built environment was not sprawling into hazardous 
areas to the same extent as today, and human soci-
eties were much less complex than today. Similar 
extreme events today could cause unparalleled dam-
age on a global scale and worsen the sustainability 
crisis. Simulation of these extreme hazards under 
present conditions can help to assess the disaster 
risk and underline the fact that we have been lucky 
during the last century.    
Large volcanic eruptions have the potential to 
impact climate, anthropogenic infrastructure and 
resource supplies on global scale. Under the pre-
sent conditions of a globally connected civilisation 
facing food, water and energy scarcity, the largest 
eruptions during the Holocene would have had 
major global consequences. Events on the scale of 
the Toba eruption 74,000 years ago could return 
humanity to a pre-civilisation state. Volcanic 
eruptions can have more severe impacts through 
atmospheric and climate eff ects and can lead to 
drastic problems in food and water security, as 
emphasised by the widespread famine and diseases 
that were rampant aft er the Laki 1783 and Tambora 
1815 eruptions. Hence extreme volcanic eruptions 
pose a higher associated risk than all other natural 
hazards with similar recurrence periods, including 
asteroid impacts.
During the Holocene, at least seven VEI 7 
eruptions took place [VEI: Volcanic Explosivity 
Index]. All but one occurred at a time when the 
global population was far below 1 billion; with a 
population above 7 billion and heading for 12 bil-
lion, a recurrence of a VEI 7 eruption could have 
extreme consequences. The probability of such 
an event occurring in the 21st century is 5–10%. 
Consequently, VEI 7 and larger eruptions represent 
a severe threat for our modern society.
Disaster Risk, Resilience, 
Antifragility and Adaptive Capacity
With the prospect of the global population reach-
ing 12 billion by 2100, humanity faces the crucial 
challenge of developing in a very limited time an 
eff ective programme to reduce the risk of global dis-
asters and catastrophes caused by natural hazards. 
Considering risk as the product of hazard probabil-
ity, sensitivity to the hazard, and the value of the 
exposed assets, it is obvious that risk mainly can 
be reduced by reducing sensitivity and exposure. 
Adaptation and mitigation eff orts to reduce sensi-
tivity and exposure represent insurance against the 
risk. Willingness to engage in adaptation and miti-
gation depends on risk perception. Th e challenge of 
extreme geohazards is that they are infrequent and 
risk awareness is generally low. Th erefore, the costs 
for adaptation and mitigation are oft en postponed.
Extreme geohazards have short unfolding 
times, leaving little room to increase preparedness 
when an event has started to unfold. Despite the 
low probability of such extreme events, their risk 
is increasing due to the increasing complexity of 
our civilisation. Eff orts to be better prepared for 
extreme events by developing general resilience are 
urgently needed, and an immediate beneﬁ t would 
be increased preparedness for frequent events that 
cause an increasing number of fatalities and rapidly 
escalating damage. General preparedness needs to 
be developed as part of the design of communities. 
For hazards with a potentially global extent, the 
provision of ‘lifeboats’ should be the aim for our 
global civilisation, just as a ship should have suf-
ﬁ cient lifeboats for the passengers in the event of 
an emergency. A focus on food and water reserves, 
technology redundancy, and social community 
resilience is therefore a prerequisite for any success-
ful global disaster risk reduction strategy.
For a better understanding of how human inter-
actions with extreme hazardous events can increase, 
or reduce, the impacts, information on the processes 
that unfold during and aft er the incidents is needed. 
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A human observatory needs to be developed that 
would collect the data needed to understand these 
processes.
Cost–Benefit Analysis of Planning 
for Extreme Geohazards
A cost–beneﬁt analysis based upon a Toba-like VEI 
8 eruption and assuming that the risk of fatalities 
could be reduced by 50% if a timely warning were 
available to allow for rapid preparations shows that 
humanity should invest in the order of $0.5–3.5 bil-
lion per year in volcano monitoring. VEI 8 eruptions 
have a frequency of 1.4 to 22 events/Ma. Assuming 
that such an event would kill 10% of the global pop-
ulation, mainly through starvation, this results in a 
probability of a random person dying in any partic-
ular year of between 1.4 x 10-7 and 2.2 x 10-6. With a 
‘value of statistical life’ (VSL) of $2.22 million, and a 
population of 7 billion, the risk for fatalities alone is 
$1.1–7.0 billion per year. This estimate is at the very 
low end because it only considers the risk of VEI 8 
eruptions and neglects those of lower VEI; it uses a 
low value of VSL; and it does not consider costs of 
property damage and indirect economic impacts. 
The more frequent VEI 7 eruptions also are 
associated with high risk. With at least seven VEI 7 
events during the last 10,000 years, there is a 5–10% 
chance of a VEI 7 eruption in the 21st Century. The 
impacts on our modern society could result in a 
global disaster, and it is timely to take measures to 
reduce this risk. 
Confronting Disaster Risks 
for Extreme Geohazards
While adaptive management works for slow 
changes, including climate change and sea level 
rise, preparing for extreme geohazards requires pre-
emptive action to increase preparedness and general 
resilience. The major geohazards that are experi-
enced frequently present an important opportunity 
for us to learn from their impact on our increasingly 
complex society. An antifragile approach provides a 
foundation for the reduction of global disaster risks.
Risk awareness and monitoring, as well as the 
capabilities and means to mitigate risk, are highly 
uneven across the world. As a result, potential haz-
ards are much more closely monitored in wealthy 
countries than in the developing world, where low 
risk awareness combined with poverty and corrup-
tion can turn a hazardous event more easily into a 
disaster. However, the largest hazards are global in 
nature, and efforts need to be made towards a well-
developed global monitoring system for geohazards 
in support of early warnings. An international gov-
ernance structure is needed to coordinate global risk 
assessments and, if needed, appropriate responses.
Research focusing on community disaster resil-
ience is in its early stages. Simulation of selected 
extreme hazards under present conditions can help 
to identify weaknesses in the global socio-economic 
system that could lead to cascading effects. Essential 
variables to be monitored by a human observatory 
need to be identiﬁed. Research on the response of 
our global community to a warning that an extreme 
hazard is developing is limited and efforts need to be 
made to understand the impacts of such a warning 
on global stability and preparedness.
Although signiﬁcant efforts have been made to 
coordinate global Earth observations (for exam-
ple through the efforts of the Group on Earth 
Observations, GEO), a comprehensive monitoring 
‘system of systems’ that could give timely warn-
ing for an impending extreme volcanic eruption is 
not in place. A monitoring system should combine 
surface displacements, gravity changes, seismicity, 
chemical variables, and infrasound to detect emerg-
ing volcanic eruptions and assess their potential 
magnitude ahead of the main eruption. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Humanity is poorly prepared to meet the challenge 
of extreme geohazards. In particular, a large vol-
canic eruption (VEI 7 or larger) would challenge 
modern society to the core. Reasons for not being 
prepared include low perceived likelihood, low 
political sensitivity, a disconnect between the sci-
entiﬁc communities and decision-makers, the lack 
of socially acceptable strategies including the cost 
of making preparations, and a common belief that 
the consequences would be so extreme that prepar-
edness is futile. To overcome these issues, a better 
process for understanding the available scientiﬁc 
knowledge and using it in proactive decision-mak-
ing needs to be developed. 
Several elements are needed to address the global 
risk from extreme geohazards:
•	A global scientific framework for strategic 
extreme geohazards science in support of warn-
ings, preparedness, mitigation and response to be 
implemented by governments, communities and 
the private sector on a global scale to minimise 
the impacts of extreme geohazards;
•	Scenario contingency planning to better under-
stand the threats and reduce the risk particularly 
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by reducing systemic weaknesses that could lead 
to cascading effects;
•	Improved risk awareness through dissemination 
of information on the risk associated with extreme 
geohazards; 
•	A global monitoring system to provide early warn-
ing for emerging extreme volcanic eruptions;
•	An informed global governance system capable of 
responding to emerging global threats and coor-
dinating measures to increase preparedness and 
general resilience with the goal of reducing the 
global disaster risk.
As an immediate step, the existing International 
Charter on Space and Major Disasters should be 
extended to include actions aimed at increasing pre-
paredness and to cover cases of emerging threats for 
early warning purposes.
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During the Holocene, the most recent geological 
epoch that started 11,700 years ago, extreme geo-
hazards occurred that were much larger than those 
experienced during the last century. These events 
rarely caused major disasters because compared to 
today population density was low, the built envi-
ronment did not sprawl into hazardous areas, and 
the complexity of human societies was much lower. 
Our modern, globally interconnected society would 
be extremely challenged if it were exposed to such 
hazards today. Even some of the large events that 
occurred a few hundred years ago could cause 
unparalleled damage on a global scale and worsen 
the sustainability crisis.
Extreme hazards – rare, high-impact events 
– pose a serious and underestimated threat to 
humanity. The extremes of the broad ensemble 
of natural and anthropogenic hazards can lead to 
global disasters and catastrophes. Because they are 
rare and modern society lacks experience with them, 
they tend to be ignored in disaster risk management. 
While the probabilities of most natural hazards do 
not change much over time, the sensitivity of the 
built environment and the vulnerability of the 
embedded socio-economic fabric have increased 
rapidly. Exposure to geohazards has increased dra-
matically in recent decades and continues to do so. 
In particular, growing urban environments – includ-
ing megacities – are in harm’s way. Because of the 
increasing complexity of modern society even mod-
erate hazards can cause regional and global disasters. 
Among geohazards (volcanic eruptions, earth-
quakes, tsunamis, landslides, ﬂoods, droughts, and 
bolides), large volcanic eruptions pose the most 
severe threat. Under the present conditions of a 
globally connected civilisation facing food, water 
and energy scarcity, the largest eruptions during 
the Holocene would today have major global conse-
quences. Events like the Toba eruption about 75,000 
years ago could return humanity to a pre-civilisation 
state. Atmospheric and climatic effects of volcanic 
eruptions could lead to severe problems for food and 
water security, causing large numbers of fatalities. 
Cascading effects resulting from disruptions of sup-
ply chains could cause a global economic crisis.
Potential hazards are much more closely moni-
tored in wealthy countries than in the developing 
world. Because the largest hazards are global in 
nature, it is critical to get as much forewarning as 
possible to formulate an effective response. For this 
reason, a well-developed global monitoring system 
for geohazards is needed, not least to support the 
early detection of extreme hazards.
In addition to the hazards, disaster risk reduc-
tion strategies also need to focus on the processes 
that lead from a hazardous event to the disaster. 
The understanding of how to reduce the complex-
ity that facilitates these processes and to increase 
community disaster resilience is still in its infancy. 
Resilience strongly depends on social capital, and 
building social capital that creates resilience needs 
to be a key element in disaster risk reduction. To 
support this, a socio-ecological observation system 
needs to be designed and implemented.
A ﬁrst-order cost-beneﬁt analysis shows that for 
a reduction in the disaster risk associated with large 
volcanic eruptions, humanity should be willing to 
invest in the order of $0.5 billion per year.
Several elements are needed to reduce the global 
risk associated with extreme geohazards: 
•	a global scientiﬁc framework for strategic extreme 
geohazards science in support of warnings, prepar-
edness, mitigation and response to minimise the 
impacts of extreme geohazards; 
•	scenario contingency planning to create the 
knowledge needed to reduce the risk by addressing 
systemic weaknesses that could lead to cascading 
effects; 
•	increase of risk awareness through dissemination 
of information on the global risk associated with 
extreme geohazards; 
•	a global monitoring system to provide early warn-
ing for emerging extreme volcanic eruptions;
•	an informed global governance system capable of 
responding to emerging global threats and coor-
dinating measures to increase preparedness and 
general resilience with the goal of reducing the 
global disaster risk.
As an immediate step, the existing International 
Charter on Space and Major Disasters should be 
extended to include actions aimed at increasing 
preparedness and awareness of emerging threats 
for early warning purposes.
Abstract
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13Our modern society is frequently exposed to geohaz-
ards, including earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, 
volcanic eruptions, ﬂoods, droughts and bolides. As 
a consequence of these events, humanity is experi-
encing increasing loss of life and property. During 
the Holocene, the most recent geological epoch that 
started 11,700 years ago, extreme events occurred 
that exceeded by far the events known to us from 
experience. Th e occurrence of any of these events 
today has the potential to trigger global disasters 
in a globally interconnected and interdependent 
society. Our dependency on the availability of ser-
vices such as power, communication, the internet 
and transportation, and the dependency of other 
services such as food, water, sewage, and health on 
these services would amplify the impact of extreme 
hazards compared to their eff ects in earlier times. 
Th e probability of any such event happening in this 
century is low but is far from zero, and the extreme 
risk associated with these hazards requires a thor-
ough understanding of the potential impacts to 
inform eff orts in disaster risk reduction (DRR).
Humanity is exposed to a broad ensemble of 
natural and anthropogenic hazards that could cause 
global disasters and catastrophes (e.g. Bostrum, 
2002; Smil, 2008). Eff orts in disaster risk reduction 
are challenged by the nature of such extreme events: 
they are rare, occur as surprises, and tend to have 
high impacts. Because they are rare and outside of 
the normal experience, knowledge is limited about 
when, how, and why they occur, and there is a ten-
dency to underestimate their frequency (Hempsell, 
2004b; Wong, 2014).
A major focus in natural hazards research has 
been on characterising the hazards and understand-
ing the processes that cause them. Most ideas about 
extreme hazards are based on indirect evidence, and 
in most cases the record of extreme events is incom-
plete. For example, about 45 of the largest volcanic 
eruptions during the last 36 million years (Ma) 
are known, but the actual number could be much 
larger (Mason et al., 2004). As a consequence, the 
frequency and associated risk of these events may be 
underestimated. Th e impacts of extreme hazards on 
the environment and modern society are difﬁcult to 
assess with certainty, especially those from indirect 
eff ects, both in the near- and far-ﬁeld. Because the 
probability of these events is low, risk as conven-
tionally deﬁned – the product of hazard probability, 
sensitivity of the assets, and value of assets exposed 
to the hazard – is hard to quantify.
Extreme natural hazards add to humanity’s sus-
tainability crisis and could push countries, regions, 
and even the global community outside the bounda-
ries of humanity’s safe operating space. Addressing 
the challenge that these rare, high-impact events 
pose to life and property is essential for the long-
term sustainability of modern civilisation. Recent 
events such as Hurricanes Katrina in 2005 and 
Sandy in 2012, the 2004 tsunami in the Indian 
Ocean caused by the Sumatra-Andaman earth-
quake, the 2011 tsunami generated by the Tohoku 
earthquake, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 illustrate 
both that the risks associated with extreme events 
are difﬁcult to estimate (Stein & Stein, 2014) and 
that procedures for reducing the disaster risk and 
mitigating the resulting losses are inadequate. Th is 
is even more so for less frequent and more extreme 
events that could occur at any time. 
Th e global and long-lasting societal and eco-
nomic impacts of the recent major events triggered 
by earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, 
tropical cyclones, ﬂoods, droughts and heat waves 
illustrate the scale of disasters that can be caused 
1. 
Introduction 
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by natural hazards, and the challenge of extreme 
events for disaster risk management. During the 
past centuries, losses have been increasing, mainly 
because more people and infrastructure are exposed 
to these hazards. Most of these losses occur dur-
ing infrequent high-impact events. Major disasters 
caused by natural hazards, which can be loosely 
deﬁned as those causing more than $100 billion 
in damage or more than 10,000 fatalities (see 
Section 2), can have enormous national and even 
global consequences. Such disasters will become 
more common as populations at risk grow and 
more of the built environment, including poten-
tially dangerous or crucial infrastructure, sprawls 
into hazardous areas. 
Disturbingly, the recent major natural haz-
ards that caused disasters with global impacts 
are dwarfed by the largest hazards that occurred 
infrequently during the Holocene and earlier. The 
potential impact on civilisation of such rare events 
tends to be ignored in planning land use, crucial 
infrastructure and services, and socio-economic 
processes. One reason for this is the low probabil-
ity of these events. However, the main reason may 
be that major past volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, 
and tsunamis, occurred when exposure of life and 
property to these hazards was far less than today 
and the complexity and global connectivity of 
societies was much lower. Although these events 
caused disasters that were extreme for the impacted 
communities, the scale of the disasters was small 
compared to the damage that similar events would 
inﬂict on today’s global civilisation. 
A fundamental difﬁculty for assessing the risks 
of global disasters is that any speciﬁc event is rare, 
making it difﬁcult to predict its occurrence and 
to determine an appropriate and sensible level of 
resources to expend defending against it, given 
other demands on resources. However, extreme 
geohazards comparable to some of those wit-
nessed in the past can occur at any time. Today, 
some of those events would cause global disasters 
and challenge the global community to an extent 
that is outside the experience of modern society. 
Therefore, addressing the risk of global disasters 
caused by low-probability, high-impact hazards is 
crucial. However, societies have not adopted a sys-
tematic approach to the problem, and instead rely 
on various policies, many of which are turning out 
to be inadequate even for much smaller events. 
A systematic approach to the understanding of 
the disaster risk resulting from extreme hazards and 
developing approaches to the reduction of this risk 
needs to consider a range of issues. These include 
but are not limited to: 
1. What is the problem and what are we trying to 
accomplish? 
2. What do we know and not know? 
3. What strategies are available to achieve our 
goals? 
4. What are the costs and beneﬁts of each of these 
strategies? 
5. What is the optimal strategy given various 
assumptions and the uncertainty involved? 
6. What societal and governance processes could 
facilitate disaster risk reduction? 
The ﬁrst issue is addressed in Section 2, where the 
terminology to characterise global risks and the 
societal goals associated with global risk reduction 
is introduced. The second question is addressed in 
Section 3. Section 4 explores approaches to reduce 
the vulnerability of modern society to extreme 
geohazards. Section 5 shows a generic cost-beneﬁt 
analysis for measures that would reduce the poten-
tial risk for global disasters resulting from extreme 
geohazards. Section 6 uses the analysis of Section 
5 to develop research, monitoring and govern-
ance strategies aiming to address and reduce risk 
from extreme geohazards on a global level. Finally, 
Section 7 summarises the conclusions and presents 
core recommendations. 
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15unanticipated cascading effects ampliﬁed the dam-
age. For example, while the occurrence of Hurricane 
Katrina in the US in 2005 and the Eyjafjallajökull 
eruption in Iceland in 2010 were not unexpected, 
the resulting disasters caused by the interactions of 
the hazards with the built environment, the services 
needed by humans, and the social fabric came as 
a surprise. These events highlighted the extent to 
which the inherent vulnerabilities of modern society 
are not understood and that preparedness for a large 
number of hazards is low. 
An important characteristic of X-events is their 
temporal development. Casti (2012) deﬁnes an 
‘unfolding time’ from an event’s beginning to its 
end, an ‘impact time’ during which the costs or 
beneﬁts are experienced, and the ‘total impact’ of 
the event in terms of costs or fatalities. For natural 
hazards, it makes sense to distinguish between the 
hazardous event occurring and the subsequent pro-
cesses that lead, or do not lead, to disaster. For many 
geohazards, the unfolding time is short, but the 
impact time can be much longer. Events with short 
unfolding times but large total impact over very 
long impact times can be surprising and difﬁcult to 
prepare for. Extreme geohazards fall into this class 
of events. 
X-events differ in terms of the disasters they 
cause. Hempsell (2004a) introduced three catego-
ries: 
•	Extinction	Level	Events are so devastating that 
more than a quarter of all life on Earth is killed 
and major species extinction takes place. 
•	Global	Catastrophes are events in which more 
than a quarter of the world’s human population 
dies and that place civilisation at serious risk. 
•	Global	Disasters are global scale events in which 
a few percent of the population dies. 
Casti (2012) deﬁnes ‘X-events’ as events that are 
rare, surprising, and have potentially huge impacts 
on human life. X-events are outliers that are found 
outside the ‘normal’ region and could lead to ‘the col-
lapse of everything’. Casti points out that scientiﬁc 
studies mainly focus on the normal region, whereas 
X-events do not lend themselves easily to scientiﬁc 
studies. As a result, much less is known about when, 
how, and why these events occur. Casti focuses on 
X-events caused by humans, and concludes that 
their increased occurrence results from “the expo-
nentially increasing levels of complexity necessary to 
preserve the critical infrastructure of modern life.” 
The recent rise in disasters caused by geohazards 
has similar aspects: increasingly, the complexity of 
modern life ampliﬁes the impacts of geohazards. 
Although signiﬁcant progress has been made in 
understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why’, for most of the 
more frequent geohazards the ‘when’ is less well 
understood (Wong, 2014). How such hazards lead 
to X-events is even less studied and understood. A 
X-event triggered by a geohazard results from the 
interaction of the hazard with the exposed, complex 
system of a modern society. Risk assessments for 
extreme hazards need to consider the processes trig-
gered in this complex system by an event that then 
leads, or does not lead, to a X-event. 
For the less frequent high-impact events, the 
questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ are even less well under-
stood and the frequency of their occurrence is highly 
uncertain. Risk assessments for extreme hazards 
are hampered by the fact that probability theory 
and statistics have limited utility in this context. 
Although estimates – albeit poor – of the probabil-
ity of the occurrence of extreme hazards exist, there 
are almost no data to assess the resulting impacts of 
such events on a modern society. In recent disasters, 
2. 
Global Disasters  
and Catastrophes
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In order to include more frequent events expe-
rienced in recent history, we introduce a fourth 
category: 
•	Major	Disasters are those exceeding $100 bil-
lion in damage and/or causing more than 10,000 
fatalities. 
Although it is not straightforward to quantitatively 
assess X-events, a simple equation gives a quanti-
tative indication of the relative importance of an 
event. Casti (2012) deﬁnes:
where X is the X-ness of an event (a measure of 
the impact of the event), E the impacted ensem-
ble (e.g. impact on the gross domestic product or 
the total annual deaths in the impacted region), 
δE the change in the ensemble due to the event, U 
the unfolding time of the event, and I the impact 
time. This equation is used to characterise the 
X-ness of recent events causing major disasters and 
to estimate the present-day X-ness of past events. 
Estimating the unfolding and impact time may 
be difﬁcult in some cases. In the case of disasters 
caused by geohazards, we consider the unfold-
ing time as the time between the point when the 
ﬁrst signs of a developing hazardous event could 
have been noticed and the point in time of the full 
development of the disaster. The impact time is 
the time it takes for the impacted community to 
return to a level comparable to that before the event 
occurred. For an earthquake, unfolding times are 
often short, although in the case of the 2010 Port-
au-Prince earthquake in Haiti, subsequent events 
(including epidemics) prolonged the development 
of the full disaster beyond the direct impacts of the 
earthquake. Estimating impact time also is chal-
lenging, particularly in cases where communities 
do not return to a situation similar to that which 
was in place prior to the event. An example is the 
decision in Japan after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake 
to shut down nuclear power plants for a prolonged 
period. Estimating the impacted population can be 
challenging, too. In the case of the 2010 eruption 
of Eyjafjallajökull, the indirect economic impacts 
were extremely widespread, and in most cases it is 
preferable to focus on the direct impacts associated 
with threats to life. 
The relative importance of disasters is poorly 
expressed by the number of deaths or the dam-
age caused by the event. For example, the 2004 
Sumatra-Andaman earthquake caused an ocean-
wide tsunami, which impacted most countries 
around the Indian Ocean to some extent (Okal & 
Synolakis, 2008), but the highest relative impact was 
felt in Aceh, Indonesia (Figure 1), where between 
3% and 4% of the total population died (Figure 6). 
The 2008 Burma cyclone, which caused more than 
100,000 deaths, killed less than 1% of the people 
in the impacted area (Figure 6). For the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake (Figure 2), the number of deaths is 
uncertain with estimates ranging from 85,000 to 
more than 300,000, which represents 5–15% of the 
approximately two million inhabitants of Port-au-
Prince and its immediate surroundings. The 2010 
volcanic eruption in Iceland was a minor volcanic 
event (Figure 3), but the interactions of the ash 
cloud with air trafﬁc caused signiﬁcant economic 
damage (of the order of US$2–5 billion; Daniell, 
2011) resulting in a relatively high X-ness compared 
to the magnitude of the hazardous event. On the 
other hand, the M=8.8 earthquake in Chile in 2010 
(Figure 4) has a very low X-ness because the num-
ber of fatalities was low compared to the impacted 
population. The M=9.0 earthquake off the coast of 
Japan exceeded the maximum magnitude 8 assumed 
in hazard planning, which resulted in a number of 
Figure 1. Although the 2004 Sumatra M=9.1 earthquake caused a large number of fatalities (Okal & Synolakis, 2008) and a global shock, this 
event has a high X-ness only in a relatively small region adjacent to the rupture, where X computed on a country basis is close to 1. In most 
other areas impacted by the tsunami, country-specific values of X are small. However, the global scale of the disaster resulted in a large effort 
to improve tsunami early warning in the Indian Ocean.
X =
δE
E
(1 −
U
U + I
)
rTh (I, x, t)= p
T
h (I, t) · S
a(x,t)
h (I, t) · v(a, x, t )
R Th (x, t) =
Imax
0
rTh (I, x, t)di
S a(x,t)h (I, t)= S
a(x,t )
h (I, t)|t= t0 −
t
t0
α (t)dt.
(1)
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Figure 2. The 2010 M=7.1 
earthquake in Haiti has a 
high X-ness, independent 
of whether the fatalities or 
the economic loss are the 
ensemble considered. 
Figure 3. The relatively minor 
eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in 
Iceland in 2010 turned into an 
economic X-event through 
interaction of the ash cloud 
with the complex air traffic 
system in Europe. In the 
aftermath of the economic 
disaster, efforts are being 
made to improve resilience of 
the air traffic system. 
Figure 4. The 2010 M=8.8 
earthquake in Chile has a 
very low X-ness, which to a 
large extent is due to the use 
of scientific knowledge of the 
probability density functions of 
seismic hazards as a basis for 
building codes and land use 
planning. 
Figure 5. The 2011 M=9.0 
earthquake in Japan has 
a medium X-ness, mainly 
because of the domino 
effects triggered by the 
tsunami in a region with high 
complexity and extreme 
dependency of infrastructure 
on the functioning of crucial 
components. Moreover, 
scientific knowledge of 
seismic hazards was not 
sufficiently integrated into 
the planning of infrastructure, 
and the scientific knowledge 
was hampered by false 
assumptions.
Left: By US Navy photo [Public domain], via 
Wikimedia Commons.  
Right: By US Marine Corps, photo by Lance Cpl. 
Ethan Johnson [CC-BY-2.0 (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.
Table 1. X-ness of recent major disasters. U is unfolding time in hours, I is impact time in years, δE is number of deaths in the region,  
and E is the total population in the region considered. Hazards are: EQ: earthquake; T: tsunami; C: cyclone. 
Region Hazard Year U I δE E X
Aceh, Indonesia EQ,T 2004 2 10 130,000–170,000 4,271,000 0.04–0.05
Pakistan, NW Frontier 
Province
EQ 2005 15 3 80,000 20,000,000 0.004
Sichuan, China EQ 2008 15 2 70,000 10,000,000 0.007
Burma C 2008 30 5 100,000 12,500,000 0.008
Port-au-Prince, Haiti EQ 2010 120 10 85,000–350,000 2,000,000 0.05–0.17
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cascading effects (Figure 5). In Table 1 and Figure 6, 
the X-ness of selected events is considered based on 
the fatalities.
In the context of X-events, ‘recurrence interval’ 
is used to refer to the likelihood of an event occur-
ring at least once anywhere on Earth within the 
given period. Thus, a 500-year ﬂood is the largest 
ﬂood that typically occurs once within this inter-
val on Earth. A 10,000-year volcanic eruption is 
the largest eruption that typically occurs within 
any 10,000-year interval on Earth. The term ‘fre-
quency’ is used to refer to the average number of 
events within a given time interval (e.g. a century, 
1,000 years, or a million years). 
It is important to note that within any given cen-
tury, assuming a Poisson distribution, the chance 
that a 100-year event occurs at least once is about 
63%. For a 1,000-year or 10,000-year event, this 
chance is close to 10% and 1% respectively (Table 2). 
This poses a large challenge for DRR. For example, 
not accounting for 500-year events in preparation 
and DRR measures implies ignoring a risk that 
has an 18% chance of materialising in the next 100 
years. 
Table 2. Recurrence intervals of events and the chance that at least 
one event takes place within any given 100 years. We assume a 
Poisson distribution. N is the number of years in which on average 
one event occurs, i.e. an N-year event, F is the frequency in a 
century, i.e. the average number of events per century, and C the 
chance that at least one event occurs in 100 years. 
N F C in %
10 10 99.99
100 1 63.21
500 0.2 18.13
1,000 0.1 9.516
10,000 0.01 0.995
100,000 0.001 0.100
Figure 6. Total death toll of 
selected recent earthquakes, 
tsunamis, and cyclones and 
percentage of local population 
killed. 
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193.1 Knowing the Upper End 
of the Hazard Spectrum 
Th e recurrence of natural hazards has oft en impacted 
human settlements at local and regional scales, 
causing signiﬁcant death and loss of property. Th e 
most extreme cases have produced very long-lasting 
impacts on the environment and have dramatically 
impacted humanity, changing the course of history 
and bringing humanity to the edge of extinction. 
Geohazards considered here include earth-
quakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, 
bolides, and other deformations of the Earth’s sur-
face that can lead to damage of property and loss 
of life, such as sinkholes, subsidence, shrinking 
and expanding soils, slope instabilities, etc. Floods 
and droughts are also considered as geohazards 
because they oft en cause landslides, erosion, and/or 
subsidence and surface deformation. Extreme geo-
hazards can cause anything from major disasters to 
extinction-level events due to direct impacts or other 
severe conditions triggered by them. Other natural 
hazards include storms, tropical cyclones, extreme 
temperatures, and solar storms. 
Recent major disasters have highlighted existing 
gaps in our knowledge of natural hazards and our 
understanding of the vulnerability of modern society 
to these hazards. Th ese disasters have also indicated 
a lack of efﬁcient transfer of the available knowl-
edge to policy and decision making, and a limited 
use of the knowledge for decision making. In par-
ticular, the recent ‘extreme’ earthquakes that caused 
signiﬁcant loss of life and property have raised the 
question of whether extreme events are accounted for 
in modern seismic hazard analyses (Wong, 2014) and 
disaster risk management. A number of earthquakes 
turned out to by unexpectedly large, such as the 1920 
Haiyuan/Gansu, China, the 1960 Chile, and the 2011 
Tohoku, Japan, earthquakes. Th is raises the questions 
of whether the maximum size and the frequency of 
these large events are underestimated in risk assess-
ments and as a consequence are not accounted for in 
risk management. It also raises the question of where 
the next large but unexpected event might occur. 
Understanding the full spectrum of geohazards, 
including extreme events with consequences from 
major disasters to global catastrophe, is a prereq-
uisite for eff ective disaster risk management and 
increased global resilience to these events. Reducing 
the disasters induced by the occurrence of extreme 
hazards at an acceptable economic cost requires a 
solid scientiﬁc understanding of the hazards. 
Reviewing the known extreme events of the past 
and projecting them onto today’s sensitivity and 
exposure of the built environment and the vulner-
ability of the socio-economic fabric illustrates the risk 
associated with the low probability, high-impact end 
of the hazard spectrum. However, to focus solely on 
the hazards does not consider the full spectrum. It 
is important to distinguish between the event, that 
is, the occurrence of a hazard, and the resulting pro-
cesses that unfold and which may or may not lead 
to a disaster. Understanding these process requires 
consideration of the form, functioning, and ‘metab-
olism’ of modern societies in order to understand 
the potential direct and indirect impacts. Th e high 
technological level of today’s built environment is 
associated with new vulnerabilities that can amplify 
the direct impact of a hazard in a chain of triggered 
failures. Th ese indirect impacts can be more severe 
than the damage caused directly by the hazards. Th e 
state of the social fabric also impacts the process that 
is triggered by a hazard, and social capital contributes 
to the scale of the disaster caused by a hazard. 
3. 
Extreme Geohazards 
l l l
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3.2 Impacts of Extreme Geohazards 
and Associated Risks 
For major geohazards, which happen somewhere in 
the world at least once a decade, the primary risks 
are to the local population and local infrastructure. 
These vulnerabilities were highlighted, for exam-
ple, in the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, Japan, which 
killed nearly 16,000 people and severely damaged 
over 400,000 buildings, leading to $122–235 billion 
in damages (World Bank, 2011). Other estimates 
resulted in classifying the earthquake as the most 
expensive earthquake of all time, causing between 
$400 and $700 billion losses and approximately 
19,000 deaths (Vervaeck & Daniell, 2012). Such 
disasters also have negative effects on the world 
economy through supply chain disruptions and 
other cascading (domino) effects, but these are 
harder to quantify. In an increasingly interconnected 
and interdependent global society, major hazards 
can result in signiﬁcant global economic impacts.
An issue in assessing disasters and trends in dis-
aster risk is the lack of comprehensive databases 
that allow for the determination of annualised 
quantities (Muir-Wood, 2012). Tables 3 and 4 com-
pile data extracted from the International Disaster 
Database (IDD), using the tool available at http://
www.emdat.be/advanced_search/index.html and 
the Prevention Web database available at http://
www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/sta-
tistics/, respectively. Particularly large uncertainties 
are present in the total damage and the total number 
of affected people. 
During the last few decades, earthquakes have 
accounted for most fatalities and damage result-
ing from natural hazards (Table 3 and Figure 7). 
Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions tend to cause 
more fatalities among impacted population than 
ﬂoods, droughts and other hazards (Table 4). In 
terms of affected population, ﬂoods are the leading 
cause with droughts being second. However, the 
ratio of deaths to affected population is two orders of 
magnitude smaller for ﬂoods than for earthquakes 
and volcanic eruptions. Hence, the X-ness of earth-
quakes is generally larger than that of ﬂoods and 
droughts. 
The major bolide explosions in the atmosphere 
or impacts in the recent past (Tunguska, 1908; 
Sulawesi, 2009; and Chelyabinsk, 2013) affected 
areas not highly populated. However, their potential 
for devastation was extremely high. Nevertheless, 
these events are currently not included in most dis-
aster-related databases. 
In the context of climate change, extreme 
weather events are occurring more frequently and 
across more extended geographical areas. At the 
local scale, tornadoes, hurricanes and ﬂash ﬂoods 
have large impacts on people and infrastructures. 
Landslides can also have catastrophic effects at the 
local scale, and landslide risk is increasing both due 
to climate change and the impact of land use on land 
cover. 
Although the rate of occurrence of a large or 
extreme geohazard is not very high, its occurrence 
in a highly populated region or megacity might cause 
devastating consequences, as illustrated by the 2004 
Sumatra-Andaman and 2011 Tohoku earthquakes 
and the associated tsunamis. The world’s growing 
population is even more vulnerable to the recurrence 
of more extreme events that have happened infre-
quently during the Holocene.
The statistics of a few decades are insufﬁcient 
to fully understand the potential impacts of low-
frequency extreme events on modern society 
because the probability that extreme events have 
been captured is low. The relatively poor knowl-
edge of the impact on populations and structures 
of past geohazards and, in particular, of extreme 
geohazards, derives from a lack of accurate histori-
cal records of such events, thus making it nearly 
Table 3. Disaster statistics for the period 1980 to 2013. Data were extracted from the IDD, using the tool available at http://emdat.be/
advanced_search/index.html. Damage is in million US $. Hazards are listed according to fatalities. R is the ratio of fatalities to the affected 
population in percent. Note that the figures are reproduced as given in the IDD without rounding. The figures have considerable uncertainties 
due to missing information or accounting issues. For example, in several years, the number of affected people for heat waves is zero, which 
means that no numbers were reported. 
Hazard Events Fatalities Affected Damage R
Earthquakes and tsunamis 865 866,882 158,794,738 737,379 0.546
Droughts 499 561,540 1,766,356,773 117,612 0.032
Floods 3,741 229,080 3,277,580,121 619,190 0.007
Extreme temperatures 461 166,921 97,822,633 54,327 0.171
Volcanoes 160 25,539 4,476,906 2,870 0.570
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Figure 7. Natural Hazards for the time period between 1980 and 
2013. Source is the International Disaster Database accessible 
through http://www.emdat.be/advanced-search/ 
7a: Number of occurrences 
7b: Total damage in $1,000 
7c: Number of affected population 
7d: number of deaths 
7e: ratio of number of deaths to affected population
Table 4. Detailed disaster statistics for the period 1980 to 2008.  
Data from http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/
statistics/. The database is the OFDA/CRED International Disaster 
Database, maintained by University Catholique de Louvain, 
Brussels, Belgium. Data version: v11.08. Damage is in million 
US $. Hazards are ordered according to fatalities. R is the ratio of 
fatalities to the affected population in percent. See Table 3 for a 
caveat on the accuracy of the numbers.
7a
7c
7e
7b
7d
Hazard Events Fatalities Per year Affected Per year Damage Per year R
Drought 410 558,565 19,261 1,551,455,122 53,498,452 76,949 2,653 0.036
Cyclone 1,211 402,911 13,893 496,560,639 17,122,781 533,371 18,392 0.081
Earthquake 706 385,630 13,298 136,333,515 4,701,156 351,079 12,106 0.283
Tsunami 18 229,551 7,916 2,481,879 85,582 10,046 0.346 9.249
Flood 2,887 195,843 6,753 2,809,481,489 96,878,672 397,334 13,701 0.007
Heatwave 126 89,889 3,100 4,614,411 159,118 21,990 758 1.948
Volcano 140 25,197 869 4,080,791 140,717 2,871 99 0.617
Landslide 366 20,008 690 7,031,523 242,466 6,060 209 0.285
Cold wave 156 11,595 400 6,875,103 237,073 5,902 204 0.169
Tornado 182 4,780 165 12,710,204 438,283 31,511 1,087 0.038
Avalanche 73 3,532 122 69,637 2,401 807 28 5.072
Wild ﬁre 294 1,666 57 5,766,092 198,831 42,807 1,476 0.029
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3.3 Earthquakes and Tsunamis 
Large to extreme earthquakes during the last 2000 
years (see Table 8 in Appendix B) illustrate the 
destruction they can inﬂict (Figure 8) directly and 
indirectly through tsunamis (Figure 9).
The resulting disasters are ampliﬁed in areas 
with poor building infrastructure (Figure 10). As a 
consequence, the earthquakes with the largest mag-
nitude do not necessarily cause the most fatalities 
or greatest damage.
In general, poor countries exposed to the same 
level of hazards as more developed countries expe-
rience a disproportionate number of disasters. 
Poverty, often paired with corruption, can turn 
hazards into disasters, and the means to increase 
preparedness and resilience are not sufﬁciently 
available in areas with high degrees of poverty.
In addition to shallow off-shore earthquakes, 
tsunamis can be caused by subaerial and sub-marine 
landslides, stratovolcanoes located on islands, and 
by impacts of bolides on oceanic areas or large 
water bodies. Aerial landslides hitting a limited 
body of water (such as a lake or a fjord) may gener-
ate extremely high tsunami waves, since the water 
cannot disperse. This was the case for the Lituya 
Bay, Alaska, tsunami (1958), which reached a maxi-
mum height of about 525 meters (Miller, 1960; Fritz 
et al., 2009) and of the Vajont tsunami (1963), which 
reached a maximum height of about 250 meters 
(Panizzo et al., 2005; Zaniboni & Tinti, 2014). 
Harbitz et al. (2014) show that submarine land-
slides have occurred along most of the continental 
impossible to extract a realistic estimate of the real 
damage inﬂicted to communities and structures. 
Sometimes these events have become part of the 
ancestral memories of populations, which allows for 
qualitative descriptions. Scientists have made efforts 
to reconstruct the effects of past large and extreme 
events on populations and environment, using the 
effects of more recent events during historical times 
to interpret past events. 
In the last two centuries, the planet has dra-
matically changed: the industrial and technological 
revolutions have triggered rapid development, pro-
moting communications and progressively 
increasing the exchange of goods and the rate 
of travel. Societies are progressively clustering 
around megacities (United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 
2014), often located in hazardous areas and heavily 
dependent on fast and efﬁcient transfer of infor-
mation and people. Most of the decision-making 
and emergency centres are located in large settle-
ments or megacities, making it crucial to assure the 
sustainability of such structures to enable timely 
decisions and support actions at local, regional and 
global levels under even the worst environmental 
conditions. 
Extreme earthquakes, impacts of large bolides, 
and volcanic eruptions pose a global threat to a 
globally inter-connected society that depends on the 
uninterrupted availability of communication, trans-
portation, power, water, sewage, food, and health 
services. In the following sections, a review of the 
potential impacts of major geohazards is provided. 
Figure 8. Deadliest great earthquakes on record. 
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margins and several volcano ﬂanks. Th e physical 
dimensions, acceleration, maximum velocity, mass 
discharge, and travel distance are properties of these 
landslides that determine tsunami generation. Th e 
authors conclude that land-slide tsunami character-
istics may exceed tsunamis induced by megathrust 
earthquakes, and hence landslide-generated tsuna-
mis may cause potentially extreme tsunami run-up 
heights. Th e tsunami hazard associated with giant 
submarine landslides related to climate changes 
and glacial cycles is in most regions negligible com-
pared to earthquake tsunami hazards, although 
an increase in melting of ice sheets could change 
this. Large-scale debris ﬂows around active volca-
noes or submarine landslides in river deltas may be 
more frequent. Harbitz et al. (2014) highlight that 
estimation of recurrence intervals, hazards, and 
uncertainties is still an open question due to a lack 
of sufﬁcient observations. Although it is estimated 
that on average bolides large enough to cause a 
signiﬁcant tsunami hit the Earth one to two times 
per century, there have been no recent records of 
large tsunamis induced by an impact in the oceans 
or on large water basins. 
Th e design of critical coastal infrastructure is 
oft en based on unjustiﬁably long recurrence inter-
vals for these extreme events. A scenario-based 
assessment of the tsunami hazard can provide more 
insight and guidance for the planning of coastal 
infrastructure. Direct impacts of tsunamis are 
Figure 9. Destruction caused by offshore earthquakes. 
Figure 10. Destruction caused by in-land earthquakes. 
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Hempsell, 2004b; Smil, 2008). The Chicxulub 
impact crater in the Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico 
is believed to be the result of a bolide impact that 
occurred approximately 65.5 million years ago and 
caused mass extinction (Gulick et al., 2013). 
Only in the last century a number of large bolides 
struck the surface of the Earth, fortunately in areas 
that were not highly populated. The Tunguska 
Fireball (June 30, 1908), generated an explosion 
which ﬂattened over 3000 km2 of forests, releas-
ing an estimated energy equivalent to more than 1 
megaton of TNT (Harkrider, 1964; Ben-Menahem, 
1975; Vannucchi et al., 2015). On October 9, 2009 
a large bolide hit the Sulawesi region, Indonesia. 
It has been estimated that the detonation in the 
atmosphere released an energy equivalent to about 
50 kilotons of TNT. On February 15, 2013, a large 
Earth-impacting ﬁreball disintegrated close to the 
city of Chelyabinsk, over the Ural Mountains. The 
blast released an energy estimated around 500 kilo-
tons of TNT (Le Pichon et al., 2013; Gorkavyi et al., 
2013; Avramenko et al., 2014) and injured more than 
1,000 people due to the effects of the shock wave on 
buildings. 
3.6 Volcanoes 
Since 1700 AD, volcanic eruptions have killed more 
than a quarter of a million people and devastated 
entire communities. Far-reaching effects impacted 
communities almost on a global scale (see Figures 14 
to 16 below). According to some estimates, the pop-
ulation directly at risk from volcanoes in the year 
2000 stood at 500 million or more, a ﬁgure certain 
restricted to coastal zones, while indirect and cas-
cading effects can reach regional and global scales. 
Mitigation of tsunami impacts is more a local prob-
lem, which require local governments to assess the 
threat, increase awareness and develop resilience 
plans. Large tsunamis such as those triggered by the 
May 22, 1960 Chile Earthquake, the March 27, 1964 
Alaskan Good Friday earthquake, the December 26, 
2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake or the March 
11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake generated waves which 
killed people thousands of kilometres away from the 
epicentre. The catastrophic effects of such tsunamis 
prompted governments to develop both local resil-
ience plans and to accelerate the establishment of 
tsunami warning centres across the globe. 
3.4 Extreme Weather  
and Landslides 
In the context of climate change, extreme weather 
events are occurring more frequently and in more 
extended geographical areas. Tornadoes, hurricanes 
and ﬂash ﬂoods have a huge impact at local scales, 
on both people and infrastructures. Landslides can 
have also catastrophic effects at the local scale. 
3.5 Bolides 
Bolides have the potential to cause extensive to 
catastrophic damage, should one hit a densely 
populated area. Indeed, the impact of a large aster-
oid could easily result in a global catastrophe or 
even an extinction level event (e.g. Bostrum, 2002; 
Table 5. Classification of volcanic eruptions. V: ejecta volume; EC: eruption classification; D: description; PH: plume height;  
FE: frequency of eruption; O: known/estimated occurrences in the Holocene. 
VEI V EC D PH FE O
0 < 10,000 m3 Hawaiian Effusive < 100 m Persistent Many
1 > 10,000 m3 Hawaiian / Strombolian Gentle 100–1,000 m Daily Many
2 > 1,000,000 m3 Strombolian / Vulcanian Explosive 1–5 km Weekly 3,477
3 > 10,000,000 m3 Vulcanian / Pelean Severe 315 km Few months 868
4 > 0.1 km3 Pelean/Plinian Cataclysmic 1,025 km ≥1 yr 421
5 > 1 km3 Plinian Paroxysmal 2,035 km ≥10 yrs 166
6 > 10 km3 Plinian / Ultra-Plinian Colossal > 30 km ≥ 100 yrs 51
7 > 100 km3 Ultra-Plinian Super-colossal > 40 km ≥ 1,000 yrs 5*
8 > 1,000 km3 Supervolcanic Mega-colossal > 50 km ≥10,000 yrs 0
* plus two suspected.
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to grow. Th is makes it all the more important that 
scientists develop their capacity to make reliable and 
timely warnings of eruptions. 
Because volcanic eruptions are complex pro-
cesses that occur in a wide range of settings and 
forms, measuring their size and hazardousness is not 
straightforward. Many diff erent scales and indica-
tors have been proposed. A descriptive classiﬁcation 
system is summarised in Table 5. 
Th e Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) was devel-
oped to estimate the climatic impact of volcanic 
eruption (Newhall & Self, 1982). It uses the vol-
ume of the erupted material and the height of the 
resulting plume to characterise the explosivity of the 
eruptions (Figure 11). However, the amount of sul-
fur dioxide gas ejected into the atmosphere, which is 
not necessarily related to the size of the eruption, is 
a better indicator of possible climate eff ects. A prob-
lem of the VEI is that it is based on estimated ‘bulk 
volume’ without taking into account the density of 
the deposited material (Mason et al., 2004). To over-
come this problem, a logarithmic magnitude scale 
of eruption size has been deﬁned as M = log10(m) 
−7.0, where m is the erupted mass in kg (Pyle, 1995, 
2000). Th is scale has been deﬁned to be close to the 
VEI. 
VEI values have been determined for more than 
5,000 eruptions in the Holocene (see Table 6 for 
examples). None of these reached the maximum VEI 
of 8. Several of the most devastating eruptions dur-
ing the last 2,000 years had VEI values lower than 
6. For example, the VEI 5 eruption of Vesuvius in 
79 AD destroyed Pompeii and Herculaneum. Since 
1500, more than 20 eruptions of VEI 5 or more 
occurred, with only the Tambora eruption in 1815 
reaching VEI 7. It is worth noting that the extremely 
disruptive eruption of Eyjafj allajökull only reached 
an estimated VEI of between 3 and 4. 
Th e number of fatalities and the amount of dam-
age have also been used to characterise the impact 
of volcanic eruptions. Th e size and magnitude of 
the hazard, i.e. the eruption, is only loosely related 
to the resulting damage. For example, mudﬂows 
triggered by the VEI 3 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz 
(Colombia) in 1985 caused one of the worst volcanic 
disaster in the 20th century. As Table 5 shows, of the 
nine greatest volcanic disasters in terms of casual-
ties since 1500, only three (Tambora, Krakatau and 
Laki) qualify as ‘very large’ eruptions with a VEI of 
greater than 5. 
It is worth noting that the VEI 5 eruption of 
Mount St. Helens in 1980 has a higher VEI than ﬁve 
Figure 11. Measures for the magnitude of volcanic eruptions. Several indicators have been proposed to measure the severity of volcanic 
eruptions. The Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) introduced by Newhall & Self (1982) is a semi-logarithmic scale that uses a combination of the 
volume of the erupted tephra (left) and the eruption plume height (right) to measure the eruption size. Note that most commercial aircraft travel 
at height between Flight Levels FL 200 and FL 350.
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In several instances over recent decades, civil 
aviation has come very close to disasters caused by 
volcanic eruptions, resulting from ash turning into 
a glass coating inside the aircraft’s engines, blocking 
their normal functioning. The most striking exam-
ples are British Airways Flight BA 9 (24 June 1982) 
and KLM Flight 867 (15 December 1989). BA 9 ﬂew 
at an altitude of 11,300 m into a cloud of volcanic 
ash generated by the eruption of Mount Galunggung, 
Indonesia. All four engines failed, causing, for the 
next 16 minutes, a descent of the aircraft without 
power to a height of 3,650 m, when the pilot man-
aged to restart three engines and make a successful 
emergency landing in Jakarta, Indonesia. KLM 867 
ﬂew through a thick cloud of volcanic ash from 
Mount Redoubt while descending into Anchorage 
International Airport. All four engines failed. After 
a fall of more than 5,000 m the pilot managed to 
restart the engines and safely land (Casadevall, 1994). 
As a consequence of these episodes the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
established the Volcanic Ash Warning Study Group 
in 1982. In 1991 Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers 
(VAACs) were set up to liaise between meteorolo-
gists, volcanologists and the aviation industry and 
issue early warnings to pilots ﬂying over airspace 
subject to risks of volcanic eruption. 
The many active volcanoes in Indonesia, Japan, 
Kamchatka Peninsula, Alaska, Aleutian Islands, 
South America, Papua New Guinea, Hawaii, Iceland 
and South Europe make it clear that at a large scale, 
communications and exchange of goods is constantly 
subject to the big threat of a large volcanic eruption. 
An obvious question arises: if a VEI 3–4 eruption in 
Northern Europe blocked air trafﬁc in Europe for a 
week, inconveniencing thousands of travellers and 
inhibiting the exchange of any type of goods, what 
would be the consequences of a larger eruption, of, 
say, VEI 7, similar to that which occurred at Tambora 
only 200 years ago? What consequences would 
result from a Plinian eruption of Vesuvius similar 
to the one that occurred in 79 AD, or an eruption 
at Phlegraean Fields, an area with the potential of 
generating VEI 7 eruptions located in the heart of 
the Mediterranean area?
Immediate and long-term casualties, long-term 
disruption to air trafﬁc with consequent interrup-
tion of provisions of numerous primary goods, 
including medications and tools to support health 
care, short- and long-term climatic changes impact-
ing agriculture and local hydrogeological systems, 
potential loss of energy, water and soil contamina-
tion, and the risk of epidemics would be some of 
the direct consequences of a large eruption striking 
highly populated areas. 
of the deadliest eruptions in the history of mankind, 
but caused only 57 deaths. The loss of life would have 
been much greater if a warning had not been issued 
based on monitoring and scientiﬁc studies, and a 
zone of restricted access had not been established. 
This illustrates the importance of monitoring and 
research to reduce the direct impact of volcanic 
eruptions. 
Mason et al. (2004) report that during the past 
36 Ma, 42 VEI 8 eruptions have been identiﬁed. 
The authors indicate that these eruptions are not 
evenly distributed in time but seem to cluster in 
two pulses over the past 36 Ma. Periods with as 
many as 22 events/Ma and down to 1.4 event/Ma 
have been identiﬁed. More recent examples are the 
eruptions of Taupo (around 24,000 BC; Wilson, 
2001), Toba (around 74,000 BC; Rose & Chesner, 
1987; Williams, 2012; Svensson et al., 2013), and 
Yellowstone (around 640,000 BC; Christiansen, 
2001), for which the impacts have been studied in 
detail. 
More recent large eruptions with a VEI of 5, 6 or 
7 include Thera (≈1630 BC), Vesuvius (79 AD), Laki 
(1783), Tambora (1815), Krakatau (1883), Novarupta 
(1912) and Pinatubo (1991). Each of these eruptions 
(except Novarupta, due to the remoteness of the 
area) generated immediate loss of life and struc-
tures at local distances (through the generation of 
pyroclastic ﬂows, ash and gas emissions, tsunamis) 
as well as long-term losses at regional and global 
distances. These eruptions impacted the climate 
for long periods by injecting ash in the stratosphere 
at high altitudes (Tambora’s ash column height 
reached 43 km) and triggering temperature changes 
which heavily impacted the harvest and led to fam-
ine and epidemics in several areas of the planet: the 
year 1816, following Tambora’s eruption, is recalled 
as ‘the year without summer’, and generated abnor-
mal temperatures in China, Europe and North 
America. 
When focusing on the potential impact of 
volcanic eruptions on modern society, it is straight-
forward to go back a few years and recall the eruption 
of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull. This minor 
VEI 3 to 4 eruption generated an ash plume with 
a height of approximately 9 km, which created the 
highest level of air travel disruption in Europe since 
the Second World War for about one week. The large 
economic loss (estimated between US$2 and $5 bil-
lion; Daniell, 2011) derived from the closure of most 
European airspace. However, grounding air travel 
prevented civil aviation disasters, thus saving thou-
sands of human lives. Should a new Novarupta VEI 
6 eruption occur in the Aleutian Range in the future, 
what would be the consequences for civil aviation? 
Ex
tr
em
e 
Ge
oh
az
ar
ds
: R
ed
uc
in
g 
th
e 
Di
sa
st
er
 R
is
k 
an
d 
In
cr
ea
si
n
g 
Re
si
li
en
ce
27
Table 6. Overview of major volcanic eruptions with regional to global impacts and/or major fatalities. MCD: Main cause of death. 
VEI: Volcanic Explosivity Index. 
Year Location VEI km3 Deaths Comment
2011 Puyehue-Cordon Caulle, Chile 4 0.3
2010 Merapi, Indonesia 4 353 MCD: pyroclastic fl ows
2010 Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland 4 0.25 0 Caused severe air traffi c disruption
1991 Pinatubo 6 6–16 847 MCD: failing roofs
1985 Nevado de la Ruiz, Colombia 3 0.03 25,000 MCD: Lahar
1980 St Helens 5 1 57
1919 Kelut, Indonesia 5,100 MCD: mudfl ows
1912 Novarupta, Alaska 6 15–30 unknown
1902 Mount Pelee, Martinique 4 >0.1 29,000 MCD: pyroclastic fl ow
1902 Santa Maria, Guatemala 6 20 >5,000
1883 Krakatau, Indonesia 6 21 36,000 MCD: tsunami
1882 Galunggung, Indonesia 5 4,000 MCD: mudfl ows
1815 Tambora, Indonesia 7 150 92,000 MCD: starvation
1783-85 Laki and Grimsvoth, Iceland 6 14 9,400 MCD: famine and fl uorine poisoning; 
deaths are for Iceland only
1660 Long Island 6 30
1650 Kolombo 6 60
1631 Vesuvius, Italy 3,500 MCD: mud and lava fl ows
1600 Huaynaputina 6 30
1580 Billy Mitchell 6 14
1477 Baroarbunga, Iceland 6 10
1280 Quilotoa 6 21
969±20 Changbai, China 7 76–116
230 Taupo 7 120
79 Vesuvius, Italy 5 2.8–3.8 3,400 MCD: ash fl ows
1610±14 BC Santorini 7 99
4350 BP Kikai 7 80–220
5550±100 BC Kurile 7 140–150
5677±50 BC Crater Lake 7 150
26500 BC Oruanui, New Zealand 8
73000±4000 BP Toba, Indonesia 8 2500–
3000
Killed up to 60% of the global 
population; MCD: starvation
640000 BP Yellowstone 8 1000
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– known as the Mist Hardships – were catastrophic. 
An estimated 20–25% of the population died in the 
famine and from ﬂuorine poisoning after the ﬁssure 
eruptions ceased. Around 80% of sheep, 50% of cat-
tle, and 50% of horses died because of dental and 
skeletal ﬂuorosis from the 8 million tons of hydrogen 
ﬂuoride that were released. There is evidence that the 
Laki eruption weakened African and Indian mon-
soon circulations, reducing precipitation over areas 
in Africa. The resulting famine that afﬂicted Egypt 
in 1784 cost it roughly one-sixth of its population. 
The eruption also affected the southern Arabian 
Peninsula and India. In Great Britain, the summer 
of 1783 was known as the ‘sand-summer’ because 
of the ash fallout. An estimated 25,000 people died 
in the UK because of breathing problems. Impacts 
Large eruptions can also impact climate, anthro-
pogenic infrastructure and resource supplies on a 
global scale. Some of the larger eruptions during 
recent centuries provide examples that may allow 
us to assess what impacts the recurrence of simi-
lar events under today’s conditions might have. 
However, six of the seven largest volcanic eruptions 
known in the Holocene took place while the global 
population was far below 1 billion (Figure 13).
The eruption of Laki in Iceland in 1783 caused 
about 9,350 deaths in Iceland. Although there was 
little direct impact, the eight-month emission of 
sulfuric aerosols resulted in a large distribution of 
the ash cloud (Figure 14) causing one of the most 
important climatic and socially repercussive events 
of the last millennium. The consequences for Iceland 
Figure 12. Major volcanic eruptions during the last 2,000 years and selected eruptions during the last 2 Ma. 
Figure 13. VEI 7 eruptions 
during the Holocene, and 
global population. Recent 
studies indicate that we are 
heading for a global population 
of 12 billion by 2100. For 
details on the eruptions, see 
Table 6.
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were reported throughout Europe, North America, 
and the Gulf of Mexico. The eruptions contributed 
to several years of extreme weather in Europe. 
The eruption of Mount Tambora in 1815 is the 
volcanic event with the largest number of direct 
fatalities, 71,000, in historic times. The ash cloud 
(Figure 15) caused global climate anomalies that 
including the ‘volcanic winter’, and 1816 became 
known as the ‘year without a summer’. Crops 
failed and livestock died in much of the Northern 
Hemisphere, resulting in the worst famine of the 
19th century. The resulting ‘stratospheric sulfate 
aerosol veil’ caused persistent dry fog in the north-
ern United States. Average global temperatures 
decreased by about 0.4–0.7 K causing signiﬁcant 
agricultural problems around the globe. Climate 
impacts are illustrated by frost and snow in June 
and subsequent months along the east coast of the 
USA. Part of Europe experienced a cooler sum-
mer and a stormier winter. This pattern of climate 
anomaly has been blamed for the severity of the 
typhus epidemic in southeast Europe and the east-
ern Mediterranean between 1816 and 1819, as well 
as the worldwide spread of a new strain of cholera 
originating in Bengal in 1816.
The eruption of Krakatau, Indonesia, in 1883 
caused 36,500 deaths. After several months of 
increasing activity, the August 27, 1884 eruption 
was the most intense and could be heard 3,110 km 
away in Perth, Western Australia and in the island 
of Rodrigues near Mauritius 4,800 km away. The 
ash cloud covered a large fraction of South-East 
Asia and reached western Australia (Figure 16). 
The energy released is estimated at 200 megatons 
of TNT. Ash was injected into the atmosphere to 
an estimated height of 80 km. Each of the August 
27, 1884 explosions was followed by a tsunami, with 
one estimated at over 30 m in height. A large area 
of the Sunda Strait and a number of places on the 
Sumatran coast were affected by pyroclastic ﬂows, 
which generated the tsunamis when they collapsed 
in the ocean. 
Table 7. Historic volcanic eruptions had large environmental impacts and most of them would today have far-reaching impacts disrupting 
crucial infrastructure at a continental to global scale. 
Figure 14. Extent of areas impacted by volcanic ash during the Laki, 
Iceland eruption in 1783. 
Figure 15. Extent of area impacted by volcanic ash during the 
Mount Tambora eruption in 1815. 
Deaths Volcano Year Cause of death VEI
92,000 Tambora, Indonesia 1 1815 Starvation 7
36,000 Krakatau, Indonesia 1 1883 Tsunami 6
29,000 Mt. Pelee, Martinique 1902 Ash flows 4
25,000 Ruiz, Colombia 1985 Mudflows 3
14,300 Unzen, Japan 1792 Tsunami ?
9,350 Laki, Iceland 1- 2 1783 Starvation 6
5,110 Kelut, Indonesia 1919 Mudflows ?
4,011 Galunggung, Indonesia 1882 Mudflows 5
3,500 Vesuvius, Italy 1631 Mud and lava flows ?
3,400 Vesuvius, Italy 79 Ash flows 5
1. These eruptions are presented in more detail as examples. 2. Only deaths in Iceland are counted.
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These examples illustrate that for volcanic erup-
tions of VEI 7 or 8, the risk of dramatic reductions 
in food supply at the local, regional and global 
level is very high. Large volcanic eruptions leave a 
signiﬁcant number of ﬁngerprints on the environ-
ment, as they impact the biosphere at different levels 
and can generate dramatic short or long-term cli-
mate changes (Self, 2006; Self & Blake, 2008). One 
example was the VEI 8 Toba eruption in Sumatra 
about 74,000 years ago, which released roughly 
800 km3 of ash and aerosols into the atmosphere, 
which covered much of Southeast Asia to a depth of 
more than 10 cm (Matthews et al., 2012; Petraglia 
et al., 2012), enough to destroy much of the veg-
etation, and cooling mid-latitude temperatures by 
5–15 K for several years (Jones, 2007). Smil (2008) 
notes that today “a Toba-sized eruption in a similar 
location would, besides killing tens of millions of 
people throughout Southeast Asia, destroy at least 
one or two seasons of crops needed to feed some 
2 billion people in one of the world’s most densely 
populated regions. This alone would be a catas-
trophe unprecedented in history, and it could be 
compounded by much reduced harvests around the 
world. Compared to these food-related impacts, the 
damage to machinery, or the necessity to suspend 
commercial ﬂights until the concentrations of ash 
in the upper troposphere returned to tolerable levels, 
would be a minor consideration.” 
Perhaps even more threatening than the imme-
diate destruction of crops is the possibility that 
global crop yields would be signiﬁcantly reduced 
for several years by sharply reduced temperatures. 
At present, there are no good estimates of the crop 
losses we might expect from such a multi-year global 
temperature drop, but we can get some hint from 
the emerging literature estimating the effects of 
global warming on agriculture. The 2007 IPCC 
Assessment Reports suggests that even a fall of a few 
Kelvin would have a substantially negative effect 
on crop yields, and that losses increase sharply for 
larger changes (Parry et al., 2007). 
The most important volcanic gas in terms of 
the potential climate impacts of eruptions is sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), but few studies have focused on the 
amount and temporal distribution of SO2 emission 
during major eruptions (Mandeville et al., 2009). 
A study of the degassing of the magmas during the 
eruption of Mt. Mazama about 7,700 years B.P., 
which created Crater Lake, Oregon, indicated that 
the amount of mantle sulfur degassed may be larger 
than previously thought. The amount of SO2 for the 
Mt. Mazama eruption is estimated to be an order of 
magnitude more than for the 1991 VEI 6 Pinatubo 
eruption (Mandeville et al., 2009). The climate 
impact of volcanic eruptions is complex. For the 
Pinatubo eruption, which injected about 17 mega-
tons of SO2 into the middle and lower stratosphere, 
model studies indicate that the climate impact 
was associated with stratospheric warming and a 
global tropospheric cooling (Stenchikov et al., 1998), 
which on the northern hemisphere separates into a 
tropospheric summer cooling and winter warming 
pattern (Kirchner et al., 1999). The Pinatubo erup-
tion caused an average global cooling of 0.5 K over 
three years (Ward, 2009). It can be expected that a 
VEI 7 eruption could have a much larger climate 
impact, which under present-day conditions could 
be devastating for food security. 
3.7 Comparison of Geohazards  
and Other Natural Hazards 
For modern society, geohazards are among the most 
impactful natural hazards at recurrence intervals 
of up to several decades. Over the last few decades, 
earthquakes combined with tsunamis, as well as 
ﬂoods and droughts, have caused the main fraction 
of loss of life and damage. As a consequence, DRR 
is focused on these events, and successes in DRR are 
mainly related to these hazards. 
Other hazards that have the potential to chal-
lenge civilisation at the core include solar storms, 
viruses, and climate change impacts (Figure 17). 
Anthropogenic climate change is rapidly increasing 
the impacts of extreme temperatures, and it could 
well be that a change along the lines indicated in 
Figure 16. Extent of direct impact of the Krakatau, Indonesia 
eruption, 1883. 
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) assessments could soon turn extreme 
temperature events into major hazards with the 
potential of global disasters. Likewise, a change 
in ﬂood and drought magnitude and frequency 
could lead to higher impacts of the hazards with 
the potential of global catastrophe due to indirect 
eff ects on food and water security. Th e combined 
impacts of anthropogenic climate change thus could 
be the most important hazard on timescales of a 
few decades up to centuries. Th e uncertainty in full 
impact ranges from major disasters to global catas-
trophes. 
Pandemics have the potential to cause global 
catastrophes in terms of the loss of life. Th e so-
called Black Death, peaking in Europe in the years 
1346–53, was one of the most devastating pandem-
ics in human history, causing an estimated 75 to 200 
million deaths (e.g. Hays, 2003). Th e ‘Spanish Flu’ 
pandemic, which lasted from 1918 to 1920, killed 
between 3 and 5% of the global population at that 
time. Th e memory of these global events has led to a 
global awareness of the risk, and any sign of a poten-
tial pandemic leads to an international response. 
Th e 2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa is the 
most recent case, which triggered a global response. 
Th e extremely high dependency of modern soci-
ety on communication, internet, and power has 
created a vulnerability to solar storms that did not 
exist when the last powerful solar storm hit the earth 
in 1927 (Kappenman, 2012). Under today’s condi-
tions and interdependencies, a comparable storm 
could have devastating long-lasting global conse-
quences. In particular, high-voltage transformers 
in the power grid are most likely to fail in a geo-
magnetic storm, and they are also among the parts 
of the grid most difﬁcult to replace (Kappenman, 
2012). 
Th e risk associated with less-frequent, high-
impact events has been assessed in several recent 
studies (e.g. Smil, 2008; Schweickart et al., 2008). 
A main conclusion was that “because NEO [near-
Earth object] impacts represent a global, long-term 
threat to the collective welfare of humanity, an 
international program and set of preparatory meas-
ures for action should be established” (Schweickart 
et al., 2008). Recently the International Asteroid 
Warning Network (IAWN) was established (see 
http://minorplanetcenter.net/IAWN for details) 
as part of the United Nations’ eff ort to mitigate the 
near-Earth object (NEO) impact threat. Mitigation 
includes detection, follow-up, and characterisation 
of NEO impact threats as well as the development of 
possible deﬂection techniques. Acknowledging that 
international response capacity is needed to deal 
with any early warning of a large NEO approaching 
Earth, the Space Missions Planning Advisory Group 
(SMPAG) was created in 2013 with the primary pur-
Figure 17. Qualitative comparison of the disaster risk associated with natural hazards. Not included are solar storms and extreme temperature 
events. Note that DRR focuses mainly on events experienced in the recent past, i.e. events with recurrence periods of 10 to 100 years.
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pose “to prepare for an international response to a 
NEO threat through the exchange of information, 
development of options for collaborative research 
and mission opportunities, and to conduct NEO 
threat mitigation planning activities.” 
It is worthwhile to note that for large bolides that 
could cause X-events, recurrence periods exceed 1 
Ma. For recurrence periods of up to 1 Ma, large 
volcanic eruptions (magnitude 8 or more) are asso-
ciated with larger risks than these impactors (Mason 
et al., 2004). Consequently, the global community 
should take the threat of a major volcanic erup-
tion as seriously as that of a major impact. A major 
volcanic eruption could easily kill (through the 
many indirect effects, in particular, food scarcity) 
a higher percentage of the global population than 
the Spanish Flu, if it occurred without any global 
preparation efforts. Therefore, there is an urgent 
need to develop global mechanisms to detect a 
looming eruption as early as possible and to have 
an internationally coordinated response to an early 
warning. 
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33With the global population exceeding seven billion 
and the prospect of it reaching 12 billion by 2100 
(Gerland et al., 2014), humanity faces the crucial 
challenge of developing in a very limited time an 
eff ective programme to reduce the risk of global dis-
asters and catastrophes caused by natural hazards 
and, in particular, by extreme geohazards. Following 
Glavovic (2013), it is suggested that metrics should 
be developed to measure progress towards four 
aspects of sustainable communities: (1) disaster risk 
and vulnerability; (2) resilience and antifragility; (3) 
adaptive capability; (4) livelihood. 
Disaster risk results from the vulnerability of 
those communities exposed to natural hazards. 
Th e study of the vulnerability of human and natural 
systems to hazards is a relatively new interdiscipli-
nary ﬁeld, which is developing particularly with a 
view on climate eff ects and other natural hazards. A 
common language has not been developed yet, and 
experts from diff erent ﬁelds assign diff erent mean-
ings to the terms used (e.g. Dolan & Walker, 2003). 
In particular, approaches diff er between the natural 
and social sciences (e.g. Brooks, 2003). 
A general assumption is that decisions on risk 
management need to take into account the prob-
ability of a hazard occurring, and the ability of a 
human socio-economic system or an ecosystem to 
cope with the hazard. Th e ability of a community 
to cope with hazards and to recover from the result-
ing disturbances is addressed within the concept of 
resilience. Th e ability to learn from a disaster and 
not just return to pre-event conditions is at the core 
of antifragility (Taleb, 2012). 
Following the approach common to natural sci-
ences, we distinguish between hazards and their 
probability, sensitivity of the built environment 
and community vulnerability to these hazards, and 
the exposure of the assets to potential hazards. Th e 
product of these three factors determines the risk 
(Box 1). Th e separation of these factors is impor-
tant to understand how past evidence can be used 
to assess the disaster risk associated with future 
occurrences of extreme geohazards. 
As pointed out earlier, for extreme hazards this 
approach may underestimate the risks because the 
available statistics are insufﬁcient to estimate reliable 
probabilities for the extremes. Another complication 
results from the fact that the time dependence of the 
three factors in the equation is very diff erent. For 
most geohazards, the recurrence as determined by 
their PDF does not change much over time during 
time intervals relevant to human societies. Th us the 
past provides information on recurrence, except for 
the extreme end of the hazard spectrum (as pointed 
out in Section 3). However, the past tells us little 
about the disaster risk associated with these hazards 
because sensitivities, vulnerabilities and exposure 
have changed dramatically over time. In particular, 
the last few decades have seen rapid development of 
urban areas and crucial infrastructure in hazardous 
areas, including megacities. An extreme example is 
Tokyo, which increased in size from roughly 1 mil-
lion in 1900 to more than 30 million in 2000. While 
exposure has increased, in many areas sensitivity and 
vulnerability have changed due to a transition of the 
built environment to high-tech infrastructure, with 
low resilience with respect to failures, and a metabo-
lism of interdependent processes and communities. 
In particular, the increasing interdependencies 
between services such as power, communication, 
transportation, water, sewage, food, health, and so 
on, in an increasingly interconnected world, as well 
as the lack of redundancies, increases vulnerability 
on all spatial and temporal scales.
4. 
Disaster Risk, Resilience, 
Antifragility and Adaptive Capacity 
l l l
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spatial exposure of assets. Adaptation and mitiga-
tion are insurance against the risk. While the risk 
equation [see Equations (2) and (3)] provides a basis 
for a quantitative analysis of the risk, willingness 
to engage in adaptation and mitigation depends 
on risk perception. Zahran et al. (2008) found that 
those cities that had suffered more from extreme 
events were more willing to commit to a Cities for 
Climate Protection (CCP) campaign. The challenge 
of extreme geohazards is that they are infrequent 
and risk awareness is generally low, and costs for 
adaptation and mitigation are often postponed. 
As mentioned above, another relevant term 
is resilience, the ability of a system to absorb dis-
turbance while retaining its basic function and 
structure (Walker & Salt, 2006). A recent deﬁnition 
includes preparedness and the ability to adapt to 
change (‘resilience’ means the ability to anticipate, 
For most natural hazards, including most geo-
hazards, there are limited options to impact p. 
However, in some cases, land use can signiﬁcantly 
change the PDF of a hazard (e.g. for ﬂoods, droughts, 
landslides). Likewise, climate (in particular changes 
in precipitation and temperature) can modify the 
PDF signiﬁcantly. An example is the increasing 
melting of permafrost in northern Canada and 
Alaska, which has led to increased landslides that 
threaten roads and pipelines. Increased precipitation 
and periods of more rapid snow melt can change the 
PDF for ﬂoods and droughts (e.g. Solomon et al., 
2007). Human action can change seismic hazards 
through large reservoirs, water extraction (e.g. Amos 
et al., 2014) and, most recently, fracking. 
The main measures for risk reduction lie in a 
reduction of sensitivity of assets to hazards and 
overall community vulnerability and, if possible, the 
Box 1
Risk equation for a given hazard h with recur-
rence time interval T, and intensity I, the 
associated risk r(I) expressed in currency is 
given by
 
where x is the location, t time, p the probability 
density function (PDF) of the hazard giving the 
probability that the hazard with intensity I will 
occur in the considered recurrence interval, S 
the sensitivity of the asset a exposed at loca-
tion x to hazard h at intensity I, and v being the 
value of a. To assess the total risk R associated 
with a hazard, we can use
(modiﬁed from Plag & Jules-Plag, 2013). 
Equations (2) and (3) provide a basis for risk 
assessment and prioritising of mitigation, 
adaptation and monitoring. The risk is strongly 
dependent on the chosen recurrence time inter-
val. Selecting a short time interval may seriously 
underestimate the risk, while a very long inter-
val may lead to unrealistically high risks. Assets 
can be any system from a single building, a 
transportation infrastructure, a city, or a socio-
economic system, to an ecosystem or a natural 
resource such as groundwater. Here, ‘sensitivity’ 
is used to indicate the damage a hazard would 
cause to an asset if the asset were to be exposed 
to the hazard. In many publications, the sen-
sitivity factor is denoted as ‘vulnerability’. 
‘Sensitivity’ is used rather than ‘vulnerability’ to 
avoid misunderstanding. Climate scientists tend 
to consider vulnerability in terms of the likeli-
hood of impacts of weather- and climate-related 
events (Nicholls et al., 1999) or the damage 
inﬂicted by changes in climate (outcome vul-
nerability) (e.g. Kelly & Adger, 2000; Pielke Sr. 
et al., 2012), while social scientists often consider 
vulnerability as the set of socio-economic fac-
tors determining the ability of a social system to 
cope with stress or change (contextual vulner-
ability) (Allen, 2003; Glavovic, 2013). As deﬁned 
here, sensitivity does not depend on the hazard 
actually occurring but is a latent characteristic 
of the asset. For example, one building may 
be more sensitive to ﬁre hazards than another 
building, independent of the ﬁre actually occur-
ring. All three factors in Equation (2) depend on 
time. Both natural and anthropogenic assets at 
a given location can change and their value can 
change as well. Sensitivity of the assets also can 
change over time. In particular, adaptation can 
reduce sensitivity, while pre-stress can increase 
it. If we denote the impact of adaptation at time 
t on sensitivity by α(t), then sensitivity is given 
by
The probability p of a hazard h of intensity I 
occurring within time interval T also depends 
on time. Particularly for climate-related haz-
ards, climate change will change p. 
X =
δE
E
(1 −
U
U + I
)
rTh (I, x, t)= p
T
h (I, t) · S
a(x,t)
h (I, t) · v(a, x, t )
R Th (x, t) =
Imax
0
rTh (I, x, t)di
S a( ,t)h (I, t)= S
(x,t )
h (I, t)|t= t0 −
t
t0
α (t)dt.
X =
δE
E
(1 −
U
U + I
)
rTh (I, x, t)= p
T
h (I, t) · S
a(x,t)
h (I, t) · v(a, x, t )
R Th (x, t) =
Imax
0
rTh (I, x, t)di
S a(x,t)h (I, t)= S
a(x,t )
h (I, t)|t= t0 −
t
t0
α ( )dt.
X =
δE
E
(1 −
U
U + I
)
rTh (I, x, t)= p
T
h (I, t) · S
a(x,t)
h (I, t) · v(a, x, t )
R Th (x, t) =
Imax
0
rTh (I, x, t)di
S a(x,t)h (I, t)= S
a(x,t )
h (I, t)|t= t0 −
t
t0
α (t)dt.
(3)
(2)
(4)
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assessing the likelihood of an extreme event are 
ingredients for a signiﬁcant reduction of the direct 
risk. The main challenge of these events is the indi-
rect risk resulting from global interdependencies. 
The livelihood of community depends on 
efﬁcient DRR, but is crucial for any capacity to 
engage in DRR. Communities that are struggling 
to secure their livelihood are fragile and have less 
capacity to engage in DRR, develop resilience, or 
increase adaptive capabilities. Effective DRR has to 
take this into account. 
DRR strategies depend on the scale of the haz-
ard. A thorough risk assessment is the starting point 
for all scales and events. Tools for risk assessment at 
local scale are rapidly developing (e.g. Bernknopf et 
al., 2006), but methodologies and tools for assess-
ments of global risks are less developed and often 
ad hoc. Early warning systems need to be an inte-
gral part of DRR. The interaction of societal and 
environmental conditions impact vulnerability and 
risk, and monitoring of socio-ecological processes 
appears important for detection of changes in the 
risk spectrum. 
For hazards with predominantly local scales, the 
optimal strategy is to avoid hazardous areas where 
possible. Risk can also be reduced through a built 
environment adapted to the hazards to which it is 
exposed, and redundancy can help to ensure ser-
vice availability during and after hazardous events. 
Increasing modularity reduces interdependencies 
and helps to reduce the scale of disasters. The role 
of social capital in limiting the impact of hazardous 
events, particularly in the recovery phase, is increas-
ingly recognised. 
For hazardous events at regional scales, robust-
ness of the built environment is crucial. Global 
redundancy and modularity are central to avoid 
cascading effects and far-reaching impacts. The need 
for redundancy and modularity conﬂicts to some 
extent with globalisation of the economy. Having 
reserves is equally important, and, again, this is in 
conﬂict with an economy operating to a large extent 
on a just-in-time principle. 
For the hazards with potentially global extent, 
DRR is extremely challenging. Being equipped with 
‘lifeboats’ should be the aim for global civilisation, 
just as a ship should have sufﬁcient lifeboats for its 
passengers in the event of an emergency. A focus 
on food and water reserves, technology redundancy, 
and social community resilience are therefore pre-
requisites for any successful DRR. 
For a better understanding of how human 
interactions with hazardous events can increase, or 
reduce, the impacts, information on the processes 
that unfold during and after events is needed. 
prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and 
withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from 
disruptions; The White House, 2013). Social and 
ecological resilience are related (Adger, 2000). 
For a social system, resilience is the ability to cope 
with external and internal stresses as a result of 
social, political and environmental change. For 
an ecological system, resilience is the ability of the 
ecosystem to maintain itself in the face of distur-
bance. Particularly for communities depending on 
ecological and environmental resources for their 
livelihoods, there is a clear link between social and 
ecological resilience. On a global scale, resilience of 
humanity is linked to the resilience of the global 
biosphere to human interference, including human 
climate forcing (National Research Council, 2005) 
coupled with natural climate variations which are 
often quite large (Rial et al., 2004; Meko et al., 
2007). There are global boundaries whose trans-
gression may put the global ecosystem into a new 
state, which could be acceptable for ecosystems, but 
outside of the safe operating space for humanity 
(Rockström et al., 2009a,b). Decisions on mitigation 
of impacts on ecosystems has to account for this link 
between ecological and social resilience. 
Adaptive capacity is important for events with 
long unfolding times, such as climate change and 
sea level rise. However, it is also important to 
adapt to changing knowledge about risks and new 
emerging threats. The growing understanding that 
extreme geohazards, in particular extreme volcanic 
eruptions, pose a grossly underrated risk requires 
signiﬁcant adaptation of major parts of modern 
societies, if there is a consensus that the global dis-
aster risk associated with these rare but high-impact 
events should be reduced. 
Extreme geohazards have short unfolding times, 
leaving little room to increase preparedness when 
an event has started to unfold. General prepared-
ness needs to be developed as part of the design 
of communities. For earthquakes, the unfolding 
time is extremely short, and early warnings that a 
particular event is going to happen are absent or 
unreliable. Therefore, immediate warnings during 
the initial phase of an event are crucial to mitigate 
impacts on infrastructure and to avoid cascading 
effects. Preparedness of both the built environment 
and the social fabric is the basis for this mitigation. 
For tsunamis, warning times can be as short as a few 
minutes, so preparedness of the population has to be 
the focus of DRR. 
For extreme volcanic eruptions, precursors are 
very likely to occur over a longer period of weeks 
to years. Monitoring systems that can detect these 
precursors and models capable of quantifying and 
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Currently, a human observatory is lacking that col-
lects data needed to understand these processes. 
Much of the data currently available are collected 
in the post-event phases. The use of Big Data and 
modern technology could help to increase the socio-
economic and ecological database. 
It also needs to be emphasised that extreme 
hazards have the potential to reduce civilisation to 
pre-industrial or pre-civilisation levels and lead to 
the ‘collapse of everything’ (Casti, 2012). Despite the 
low probability of such events, their risk is increas-
ing due to the increasing complexity of modern 
society. To reduce risk, there is an urgent need to be 
precautionary with respect to the extreme hazards 
and to be prepared for possible 1 in 1,000 or 10,000-
year events, that could happen in the next 100 years. 
The immediate beneﬁt would be that we would also 
be better prepared to handle more frequent events 
that cause an increasing number of fatalities and 
rapidly escalating damage.
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37rate would be much less than the 60% seen in the 
aftermath of Toba’s eruption 75,000 years ago, but it 
would be unrealistic to expect fewer fatalities than 
in some of the 20th century’s tragedies, such as the 
1918 ﬂu pandemic, which killed between 3% and 5% 
of the world’s population (Taubenberger & Morens, 
2006). For the sake of round numbers, it is assumed 
here that the worldwide fatality rate would be about 
10% if the eruption occurred as a surprise (the con-
clusion that the beneﬁts of allocating resources to 
reduce mortality greatly exceed the costs will turn 
out not to be overly sensitive to this number). 
To proceed with the cost–beneﬁt analysis (CBA), 
a decision needs to be made how much it is worth 
spending to reduce the mortality risks. The tradi-
tional approach has been to put a monetary value on 
each life which we can expect to save by some policy 
change. The value of one life saved is called the value 
of a statistical life (VSL). VSLs are typically calcu-
lated either from labour market data (e.g. looking 
at how much of a wage premium workers demand 
for performing more dangerous jobs), from product 
market data (e.g. by looking at how much extra con-
sumers will pay for a safer car, or a house in a less 
polluted area), or by survey (e.g. by asking people 
directly how much they would pay to avoid a par-
ticular probability of death). Basically, the idea is to 
see how much of their own money people will spend 
to reduce their own mortality risks – the idea is that 
government policies should not force taxpayers to 
‘purchase’ more or less safety through government 
policies than they are willing to purchase when they 
choose freely (see Viscusi & Aldy, 2003, for a sur-
vey on VSL calculations). The US Department of 
Transportation has recently determined that the 
appropriate VSL for potential road fatalities in the 
US is $9.1 million (Trottenberg & Rivkin, 2013). 
To estimate the risk associated with extreme vol-
canic eruptions, ﬁrst the potential damage of a 
volcanic event on the scale of the eruption from 
what is now Lake Toba (in Indonesia) is consid-
ered (see Section 3). This eruption, which occurred 
about 75,000 years ago, released 2500–3000 km3 
of debris into the atmosphere, and the resulting 
climatic changes are thought to be responsible for 
the death of 60% of the human population living at 
that time (Rose & Chesner, 1987). Using extreme 
value theory, Mason et al. (2004) estimate the lower 
bound for the frequency of such M8 or larger erup-
tions to be 1.4 to 22 events/Ma (see Section 3.6). 
This results in a probability of between 2.2 x 10–5 
(about 1 in 45,000 years) and 1.4 x 10–6 (about one 
in 714,000 years) that a M8 or larger eruption occurs 
in any given year. 
What would be the consequences of a M8 erup-
tion today? Smil (2008) noted that a repeat of Toba 
in the near future would devastate food supply: 
(1) directly, by depositing a metre or so of ash over 
an area of several million square kilometres, thus 
destroying one or two seasons of crops needed to 
feed two billion people; and (2) indirectly, by cool-
ing the global climate by 5–15 K for a period of up 
to a decade, and severely reducing crop yields. An 
eruption on such a scale would also cause substan-
tial physical destruction (damage to buildings, etc.), 
but such destruction would – unless the eruption 
occurred very near a densely populated area – likely 
pale in comparison to the loss of life which would 
follow from the reduced food supply. 
It is impossible to guess with precision what 
the loss of life would be if the Toba eruption were 
repeated in the modern world, but it is likely that it 
would be the greatest catastrophe since the dawn 
of civilisation. One hopes that the worldwide death 
5. 
Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis of Planning 
for Extreme Geohazards
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nology, be diverted to cause no damage, but large 
volcanoes cannot be stopped. Nevertheless, it would 
be possible to mitigate much of the loss of life, given 
sufﬁcient warning. The losses discussed above have 
their origins in the disruption of the food supply. 
Given warning, these losses can be mitigated by 
organisation, storage and knowledge. Organisation 
of the food supply would become much more impor-
tant as food became more scarce: currently a large 
proportion of the food that we grow goes to waste. 
Given time, systems of food transport and pro-
cessing could be re-designed to generate less waste 
(though at higher cost). Storage is another strategy: 
even with only a year of warning, large-scale storage 
could mitigate the risks. For example, much of the 
corn currently used to produce ethanol or to feed 
cattle could be set aside. Finally, knowledge: if the 
world cools by 5–15 K for a period of several years, 
then to preserve the food supply, crops would not 
be planted in the same places that they are planted 
now. Broadly speaking, crops would have to ‘move 
south’, but knowing exactly what to plant where is 
not obvious. With one or two years’ notice, it would 
be possible to run large-scale agricultural experi-
ments to determine optimal crop plantings for a 
temporarily cooler climate. 
Such strategies could avoid many of the deaths 
which would otherwise follow from such an abrupt 
change in climate. It might even be possible to avoid 
all unnecessary starvation. To be conservative, and 
for the sake of round numbers, it is assumed that the 
expected death toll could be reduced by half. Given 
that eliminating the risk of death from a Toba-
repeat would be worth at least $1.1 to $7.0 billion 
per year, eliminating half of the risk would be worth 
at least somewhere between $0.5 and $3.5 billion 
per year. That is the value of knowing in advance if 
another Toba is coming. 
How much would it cost to ﬁnd out if another 
Toba-like eruption is coming? The amount is not 
known exactly, but it is a lot less than $3.5 billion 
per year. For reference, the 2014 budget for the US 
Geological Survey provides $24.7 million for vol-
cano hazards (US Geological Survey, 2013). Given 
that the US represents about 1/15 of the land surface 
of the Earth, then bringing the rest of the world up 
to US levels of monitoring would only cost about 
15 x $24.7 million, or about $370 million per year. 
This is less than the lower boundary of the expected 
beneﬁt from greater monitoring. 
For the far more frequent VEI 7 events, the 
eruption of Mount Tambora in 1815 provides an 
example. There have been at least seven VEI 7 
eruptions in the last 10,000 years, and we assume 
the probability of a VEI 7 event occurring in any 
This means that the DOT assumes that a US citizen 
is (or should be) willing to pay about $910 to elimi-
nate a 1 in 10,000 risk of a fatality. 
To have a VSL for the whole world, it needs to be 
taken into account that wealthier people are willing 
to pay more for safety, and that US citizens are much 
wealthier than the world average. The DOT review 
referred to above suggests that the VSL rises one-
for-one with income, so a country with an income 
which is one quarter of the US level should have 
a VSL which is one quarter as much. It turns out 
that the average US citizen’s income is just over four 
times larger than the world average income (World 
Bank, 2013), suggesting a world VSL of $2.22 mil-
lion. 
Now the cost of a Toba-scale eruption from the 
fatalities alone without considering costs due to 
damage and impacts on the global economy can be 
calculated. If the fatality rate is 10% and the prob-
ability that the event occurs in any given year is 
between 1.4 x 10−6 and 2.2 x 10−5, then the probabil-
ity of a random person dying in any particular year 
is between 1.4 x 10−7 and 2.2 x 10−6 . With a VSL of 
$2.22 million, the average person should be willing 
to pay between $0.16 and $1.00 per year to eliminate 
this risk. Given a global population of just over 7 
billion, this corresponds to $1.1–7.0 billion per year. 
There are three main reasons why this estimate 
might be too low. Firstly, it considers only Toba-
scale eruptions; there are many smaller eruptions 
which could also occur and be very damaging. 
Including these in the calculation would at least 
double the expected damage. Secondly, assuming 
that the VSL rises one-for-one with income prob-
ably understates the worldwide average VSL. The 
one-for-one estimate is actually at the high end of 
the range. Viscusi & Aldy (2003) suggest that the 
VSL rises (or falls) at about only half this rate with 
income changes. If the Viscusi & Aldi estimates 
are used, then the worldwide average VSL would 
be closer to $4 million, and the willingness to pay 
would roughly double. Thirdly, this ignores all costs 
apart from loss of life, including losses to the capital 
stock (which are likely to be small relative to the cost 
of lives lost), and the much larger costs associated 
with potential large-scale conﬂict and partial break-
down of civilised life, which might be associated 
with a geohazard at this scale. Incorporating these 
additional costs could raise the expected damage 
by an order of magnitude or more. Incorporating 
these sources might raise willingness to pay by a 
factor of 40. 
It is not possible to completely avoid the haz-
ard posed by volcanic eruptions. Asteroids can, in 
principle, with enough warning and the right tech-
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given year to be on the order of 7 x 10−4. Although 
these events would have a lesser impact than a VEI 8 
event, being two to three orders of magnitude more 
likely than a VEI 8 event, the associated risk (i.e. 
hazard probability times sensitivity times value of 
assets) is comparable, underlining the need to invest 
in risk reduction by developing a reliable monitor-
ing system. 
To sum up, conservative estimates of the 
beneﬁts of increased monitoring are between $0.5 
and $3.5 billion per year. The actual beneﬁts may 
be 10 to 100 times larger taking into account the 
whole distribution of volcano sizes and the non-
food-supply-related avoidable costs of an eruption. 
Conservative estimates of the costs of a global moni-
toring system are at $370 million per year; this is 
possibly a substantial overestimate, since it assumes 
that there are no economies of scale in monitoring 
volcanoes. Nevertheless, the beneﬁts of a global 
monitoring system are at least 10 times larger than 
the costs. If the actual monitoring costs are two or 
three times lower, and if the expected beneﬁts are 
10 or 100 times larger, then the total beneﬁts may 
be hundreds or thousands of times greater than the 
total costs. 
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40 gies capable of acquiring and sharing in real-time 
(or near real-time) high quality data recorded on 
a global scale (Section 6.3). The systematic and 
comprehensive analysis of such data would allow 
the development of a deeper understanding of the 
phenomena associated with geohazards and pro-
grammes of Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience 
(D3R) to issue early warnings. 
6.1 Governance for Extreme 
Geohazards 
Adaptive management works best for slow changes, 
such as a slow change in climate, sea level rise, and 
so forth. It has limited applicability for extreme 
events with short unfolding times. For these events, 
evidence-based, proactive management is required. 
Major geohazards occur at least every few years 
somewhere in the world, but may only strike a par-
ticular country once or twice a century, or perhaps 
not at all. Such geohazards are the main focus of 
international risk reduction programmes. These 
hazards present an important opportunity to learn 
from their impacts on an increasingly complex soci-
ety. This is the main reasoning behind the principle 
of antifragility proposed by Taleb (2012). 
There is, however, a need for a societal consen-
sus on how to address disaster risk associated with 
extreme hazards. Any such consensus will depend 
signiﬁcantly on the available economic resources 
and the threats from anthropogenic hazards. In 
some parts of the developing world, economic 
resources are insufﬁcient to address major risks, and 
in others, anthropogenic hazards are overwhelming. 
Preventing disasters from recurring involves the 
balancing of costs and beneﬁts of policies aimed at 
Risks associated with extreme geohazards chal-
lenge humanity on a global scale. These risks range 
from extinction level events to global disasters, 
which could kill a few percent of the global popula-
tion (Hempsell, 2004b). The complexity of modern 
society increases these risks and has the potential 
to multiply the threat. A particular focus of DRR 
needs to be on intermediate level events that can 
cause global catastrophes resulting in the loss of 
at least a quarter the global population (Hempsell, 
2004a). 
Key questions that need to be answered to 
develop programmes that can help confront global 
risks resulting from extreme geohazards include: 
•	What is the status of readiness of countries to face 
the occurrence of a large or extreme geohazard? 
•	What kind of infrastructures are currently avail-
able to efﬁciently cope with the emergencies 
generated by large or extreme geohazards? 
•	What could help reduce the effects of a large or 
extreme geohazard? 
The development of an effective DRR programme 
and of a consequent robust resilience programme 
needs to be based on a holistic approach, address-
ing scientiﬁc, technical, logistic, social, policy and 
governance issues related to these hazards and 
involving all the principal stakeholders facing this 
challenge, including natural and social scientists 
and policy makers. 
A governance process is needed to bring together 
all relevant stakeholders for a community process 
(Section 6.1). To better understand the vulnerabili-
ties and assess the risk, focused research is needed 
(see Section 6.2). A main tool supporting such an 
holistic approach would be a global network of 
monitoring systems, based on synergetic technolo-
6. 
Confronting Disaster Risks  
for Extreme Geohazards 
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ing the early warning phase, can reduce disasters. 
This suggests that a well-developed global monitor-
ing system for geohazards is needed in support of 
the early detection of extreme hazards (see Section 
6.3). Secondly, low risk awareness combined with 
poverty, corruption, and a lack of building codes 
and informed land use management contributes to 
conditions that turn hazards into disasters through-
out much of the developing world. Democratising 
knowledge about extreme geohazards is very impor-
tant to inform deliberations of disaster risks and 
community strategies that can reduce the disaster 
risk by increasing resilience and adaptive capacities 
without compromising the livelihood of communi-
ties. 
DRR should focus not only on the hazardous 
event alone, but also on the processes that create the 
disaster and can be modiﬁed. The understanding of 
how to reduce the complexity that facilitates pro-
cesses leading to disasters is still in its infancy. Much 
attention in disaster risk reduction has focused 
on increasing the robustness of infrastructure. 
Any built environment is only robust to a certain 
threshold. Recent events that have exceeded these 
thresholds have brought to the forefront the impor-
tance of the social fabric and social networking in 
resilience. Resilience strongly depends on social 
capital, deﬁned as collective beneﬁts derived from 
strong community norms of cooperation and mutual 
assistance. A focus on building social capital can 
create resilience and must be a key element of DRR. 
Occurrence of hazards that cause, or nearly cause, 
disasters present a unique opportunity to learn more 
about the processes triggered by the hazard. This 
‘antifragile’ approach (Taleb, 2012) requires the col-
lection of sufﬁcient data prior, during and after the 
hazard. Therefore, a socio-ecological observation 
system needs to be designed and implemented that 
provides the basis to enable lessons to be learned 
from disasters. 
At present, DRR-related efforts are fragmented. 
Current assessment of global risk resulting from 
geohazards is still relegated to the scientiﬁc litera-
ture (e.g. Smil, 2008). Traditional DRR programmes 
focus on more frequent hazards and more at local 
to regional scales. The IPCC is restricted to the 
risks from climate change and its impacts. The 
World Economic Forum assesses global risks, but 
does not cover geohazards in these global risks in 
terms of likelihood or impacts (Figure 18 and World 
Economic Forum, 2014). 
DRR (Stein & Stein, 2014). A crucial aspect of this 
balance is that the risks and beneﬁts have to be esti-
mated, accounting for signiﬁcant uncertainties to 
infer the probabilities of the future events. 
Paradoxically, innovation during recent decades, 
in particular urban innovation, has increased the 
disaster risk and coupled this risk to the sustainabil-
ity crisis. Only more innovation can reduce disaster 
risk and lead us out of the sustainability crisis. 
Governance needs to ensure that innovations lead 
to more resilience and reduced disaster risk instead 
of increasing the risks. Participatory, deliberative 
governance for DRR requires representation from 
all societal groups. The four-order scheme proposed 
by Glavovic (2013) can be used to deﬁne disaster 
risk outcomes and associated societal processes. 
This framework can be implemented in the context 
of deliberative democracy and governance with par-
ticipation of the community. 
The current dialogue between science and soci-
ety is not fully capable of supporting deliberative 
governance and a democratising of knowledge. 
Most scientiﬁc knowledge is created independently 
of those who could put it to use, so a transition to 
co-design and co-development of knowledge involv-
ing a broad stakeholder base (Mauser et al., 2013) 
is necessary to address the disaster risk associated 
with extreme events. This transition may cause 
more responsibility and even liability for science. 
A central question relates to the responsibility and 
liability of science participation in deliberative evi-
dence-based governance. Could the scientist still be 
the expert who creates ‘peer-reviewed’ knowledge 
with a rather vague responsibility and no liability 
for it being correct or being put to use? Or would the 
scientist have to assume a role with higher liability 
for what is provided as a contribution to the deliber-
ations? The controversy in the aftermath of the 2009 
L’Aquila earthquake and the discussions around the 
IPCC illustrate the difﬁculties associated with the 
current scientiﬁc knowledge system in the context 
of a crisis, which can only be mastered based on evi-
dence and directional innovation. Likewise, these 
difﬁculties also exist in DRR, where consequential 
decisions have to be made that can impact economy, 
life, and the livelihood of many. 
Risk awareness and monitoring is highly uneven 
across the world, creating two kinds of problem. 
Firstly, potential hazards are much more closely 
monitored in wealthy countries than in the devel-
oping world. But the largest hazards are global in 
nature, and it is critical to get as much forewarn-
ing as possible to develop an effective response. The 
disasters and near-misses of the recent past show 
that using scientiﬁc knowledge, particularly dur-
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Continental topography is at the interface of 
deep Earth, surface and atmospheric processes 
(Cloetingh et al., 2007; Cloetingh & Willet, 2013a). 
Topography inﬂuences society, not only as a result 
of slow landscape changes but also in terms of how 
it impacts on geohazards and the environment 
(Figure 19). When sea-, lake- or ground-water levels 
rise, or land subsides, the risk of ﬂooding increases, 
directly affecting the sustainability of local eco-
systems and human habitats. On the other hand, 
declining water levels and uplifting land may lead 
to higher risks of erosion and desertiﬁcation. In the 
recent past, catastrophic landslides and rock falls 
have caused heavy damage and numerous fatalities 
in Europe. Rapid population growth in river basins, 
coastal lowlands and mountainous regions, together 
with global warming, associated with increasingly 
frequent exceptional weather events, are likely to 
6.2 Knowledge Assessments  
and Research Needs 
A comprehensive review of the current understand-
ing of high-impact geohazards and the challenges 
posed to DRR and the disaster risk management 
cycle was undertaken during the European Science 
Foundation (ESF)–European Cooperation in 
Science and Technology (COST) high level research 
conference held in 2011 in Spain (see http://www.
geohazcop.org/workshops). The participants of this 
conference recognised the work done by the inter-
national geohazards community to improve the 
knowledge of geohazards and the threat to society. 
Major research efforts have improved our under-
standing of the causes and processes of geohazards 
and have advanced our knowledge of the hazardous 
areas. 
Figure 18. Evolving Global Risk Landscape 2007–2014 according to the World Economic Forum. Upper diagram: in terms of likelihood; lower 
diagram: in terms of impacts. From World Economic Forum (2014).
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better understood. The challenge taken up by the 
TOPO-EUROPE programme, initiated by ESF, is 
to describe the state of the system, to monitor its 
changes, to forecast its evolution and, in collabora-
tion with others, to evaluate modes of its sustainable 
use by human society (Holm et al., 2013). The recent 
implementation of the European Plate Observing 
System (EPOS) is a milestone in this endeavour. 
Many measures required to prepare for, and 
adapt to, hazards have been developed. Likewise, 
international programmes informing governments, 
decision makers, and the general public on disas-
ter risks, and ways to reduce these risks, are being 
conducted. The current process towards a follow-on 
for the Hyogo Framework is an example of how the 
international community is addressing the disaster 
risk. The ESF 2011 conference on extreme geohaz-
ards acknowledged the work of the Geohazards 
Theme of Integrated Global Observing Strategy 
Partnership (IGOS-P) (see the 2007 Frascati 
Declaration of the Third International Workshop on 
Geohazards and Marsh and the Geohazards Theme 
Team, 2004) and the Geohazards Community 
of Practice (GHCP) of the Group on Earth 
Observations (GEO) (in particular, Geohazards 
Community of Practice, 2010). At the same time, 
the conference concluded in the conference decla-
ration (Geohazards Community of Practice, 2012) 
that the challenge of extreme geohazards is linked 
with a number of urgent research needs. Besides a 
exacerbate the risk of ﬂooding and devastating rock 
failures. Along active deformation zones, earth-
quakes and volcanic eruptions cause short-term 
and localised topography changes. These changes 
may present additional hazards, but at the same 
time permit the quantiﬁcation of stress and strain 
accumulation, a key control for seismic and volcanic 
hazard assessment (Cloetingh & Willet, 2013b). 
Although natural processes and human activities 
cause geohazards and environmental changes, the 
relative contribution of the respective components 
is still poorly understood (Cloetingh & Haq, 2015). 
That topography inﬂuences climate has been known 
since the beginning of civilisation, but it is only 
recently that we have been able to model its effects 
in regions where good (paleo-) topographic and cli-
matologic data are available.
The present state and behaviour of the shallow 
Earth system is a consequence of processes operat-
ing on a wide range of time scales. These include 
the long-term effects of tectonic uplift, subsidence 
and the development of river systems, residual 
effects of the ice ages on crustal movement, natural 
climate and environmental changes over the last 
millennia and up to the present, and the power-
ful anthropogenic impacts of the last century. If 
we are to understand the present state of the Earth 
system, to predict its future and to engineer our 
use of it, this spectrum of processes, operating con-
currently but on different time scales, needs to be 
Figure 19. Areas of 
vulnerability due to vertical 
movements in Europe, 
demonstrating the link 
between demography and 
environmental tectonics in 
Western and Central Europe 
(after Cloetingh et al., 2007). 
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to resist the impact of geohazards. These include 
historical buildings, or buildings in areas with 
high poverty built with no adherence to building 
codes, if those exist. This implies that even for more 
frequent geohazards, the risk of large loss of life, 
property and community services has dramatically 
increased. Many buildings hosting crucial human 
and infrastructure elements are exposed to hazards, 
and this can lead to chains of failure. When expos-
ing fragile communities to extreme geohazards, the 
effects caused by chains of failure are likely to have 
devastating consequences. 
Because extreme geohazards are rare, it is nat-
ural to think that it is not worth designing cities 
or relief organisations to protect against them. 
However, the risk of global disasters or catastro-
phes triggered by these hazards is extremely high, 
particularly in the context of a complex, globally 
connected civilisation. Moreover, in the context of 
multi-hazard scenarios, even moderate geohazards 
can lead to extreme consequences. In combination 
with the transition of the planet from the Holocene 
into a new post-Holocene era, the risk of global dis-
asters or catastrophes is extremely high, particularly 
given the complexity and global connectedness 
modern society. Considering the precarious nature 
of global society, the deﬁnition of major hazards 
becomes to some extent arbitrary (WMO, 2014). 
Therefore, efforts to reduce the risks associated with 
the extreme end of the hazard spectrum should be 
considered. Monitoring potential threats is of the 
utmost importance. 
To be capable of addressing the risks associated 
with extreme geohazards implies a need to build 
robust resilience for a very large spectrum of haz-
ardous events. In this context, a crucial step towards 
the development of effective disaster risk reduction 
and of a signiﬁcant level of resilience is based on 
comprehensive monitoring of all the phenomena 
and parameters which might help issue early warn-
ings in every part of the planet. 
The ability to issue early warnings is tightly 
related to the availability of reliable networks 
recording very high quality data, having high oper-
ational standards and very low downtime: all the 
available global, regional and local networks with 
such high quality performance criteria should be 
used to monitor every area of the planet and trans-
mit data to operational centres in near real-time in 
order to assure rapid analysis and identiﬁcation of 
a risk increase. 
At present, there is no system for monitoring geo-
hazards comparable to those in place for monitoring 
extraterrestrial threats. NASA has a congressional 
mandate to catalogue all near-Earth objects greater 
better understanding of the nature of the extreme 
hazards, including their PDFs, the vulnerabilities 
of modern society need to be better understood. 
Mitigation and adaptation science are only begin-
ning to address global risks (Moss et al., 2013). 
The Global Earthquake Model (GEM) “aims 
to combine the main features of state-of-the-art 
science, global collaboration and buy-in, transpar-
ency and openness in an initiative to calculate and 
communicate earthquake risk worldwide. One of 
the ﬁrst steps towards this objective has been the 
open-source development and release of software 
for seismic hazard and risk assessment called the 
OpenQuake engine” (Silva et al., 2014). Research 
needs to focus on a similar global model for extreme 
volcanic eruptions. 
As mentioned above, understanding processes 
that are triggered by extreme geohazards and 
can lead to global disasters is part of the quest to 
reveal underlying hidden risks. Community dis-
aster resilience taking into account the possibility 
of cascading effects and chains of failure is at the 
beginning of its development as a scientiﬁc ﬁeld. 
Simulation of selected extreme hazards under pre-
sent conditions can help to assess the disaster risk. 
For example, the impacts of the ash fallout of 
large eruptions on marine bio-production are not 
known. Under today’s strained ﬁshery, a reduction 
of bio-productivity would increase the global food 
price with severe consequences for social stability. 
A socio-ecological observing system will be 
needed to identify the essential variables to be 
observed. Likewise, a human observatory is required 
to provide observations about human interactions 
with the built and natural environment prior, during 
and after hazardous events. Here, too, the essential 
variables have not been deﬁned yet. 
The US National Research Council (2013) con-
sidered the threat of abrupt climate change impacts 
and proposed an early warning system on time 
scales of several years to decades. These warnings 
are comparable to a timely warning for a looming 
major volcanic eruption. What is poorly known is 
how the global community would react if a warning 
on the emerging threat of such an event were to be 
published, so research into the reaction to warnings 
on emerging global risks is necessary. 
6.3 Monitoring and Early Warning 
Modern societies are progressively clustering around 
megacities, often located in hazardous areas and 
hosting complex infrastructures. Most of the meg-
acities include structures which are not designed 
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Sheldrake, 2014; Bebbington, 2014), but with the 
limited amount of currently available data, reliable 
and robust forecasts are still not possible and fur-
ther development is needed. 
Two key questions to ask are: (1) How many 
monitoring networks are available today to acquire 
information on a global scale on speciﬁc key param-
eters associated with a given type of geohazard? (2) 
Given a speciﬁc geohazard, what is the current level 
of integration of the information acquired through 
different monitoring networks to assess the poten-
tial increase of risk? 
During the past few decades, several interna-
tional organisations have developed monitoring 
networks to collect data at a local, regional or 
global scale. For example, the Global Seismographic 
Network (GSN) of the Incorporated Research 
Institutions for Seismology (IRIS) acquires and 
shares data recorded by seismic stations distributed 
around the world. The National Weather Service 
(NWS) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) operates two tsunami 
warning centres. The Alaska Tsunami Warning 
Center (ATWC) in Palmer, Alaska, serves the areas 
of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, 
and California; the Paciﬁc Tsunami Warning 
Center (PTWC) in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, has the dou-
ble function of monitoring the area of Hawaii and 
acting as the national and international warning 
centre for tsunamis in the Paciﬁc area. Following 
the Great Sumatra earthquake in 2004, a tsunami 
monitoring service has been developed for the 
Indian Ocean region. 
For volcano monitoring, traditional observation 
systems, based on seismic waves, ground deforma-
tion, geochemical analysis, satellite and infrared 
monitoring, have been used for decades. These 
monitoring techniques have supported studies of 
volcanic hazards mostly on local and regional scales, 
rather than on a global scale. Despite progress in 
the availability of techniques for highly accu-
rate measurements of ground deformations, both 
through space-geodetic tracking stations based on 
the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and 
through Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(InSAR) (e.g. Plag et al., 2009), there is currently 
no service providing low-latency information on 
Earth surface deformation covering at least the 
areas of potential volcanic eruptions. In principle, 
such a service could be based on a low number of 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites in com-
bination with a global network of Continuous 
GNSS (CGNSS) stations. The achievable accuracy 
is better than 1 mm/year (Hammond et al., 2011). 
Currently more than 11,000 CGNSS stations pro-
than one kilometre in size, as the impact of such an 
object would be catastrophic. Efforts are also under 
way to demonstrate technologies that would help 
to reduce the threat of an impact of an approach-
ing asteroid (see i). An example is the cooperation 
be-tween ESA and NASA on the precursor asteroid 
hazard mitigation mission Asteroid Impact and 
Deﬂection Assessment (AIDA). AIDA is made up 
of two independent components, the US-led aster-
oid kinetic impactor Double Asteroid Redirect Test 
(DART) and the ESA-led Asteroid Impact Mission 
(AIM). AIM is a small mission of opportunity that 
has the goal to characterise the Dydimos binary 
asteroid system and at the same time to demonstrate 
technologies enabling future small and medium 
missions. The main goal of the AIDA cooperation 
is to prove the ability to modify the dynamics of 
Didymos in a way that is measurable both by the 
AIM observation spacecraft and from Earth-based 
facilities. 
There is no equivalent organisation with a man-
date to monitor potentially catastrophic geohazards. 
Hempsell (2004a) ﬁnds that “there are several pos-
sible space systems that could either prevent, or 
control or provide escape safe havens, but all require 
a signiﬁcant improvement of the space infrastruc-
ture in terms of size and improved economics 
to make them viable.” Hempsell concludes that 
addressing the threat of global catastrophes should 
be the prime focus of space infrastructure policy. 
Satellite monitoring systems can provide crucial 
information on many phenomena occurring on the 
Earth’s surface, or in the atmosphere (e.g. Hempsell, 
2004b). However, such monitoring might, in some 
cases, need to be complemented with additional 
monitoring systems: integrating this information 
with other types of data acquired with different 
monitoring networks can provide a more compre-
hensive view on the status of a certain region of the 
Earth and assess the level of risk in that area. For 
example, space-based observations complemented 
with ground-based tracking stations provide a basis 
for the global monitoring of Earth surface deforma-
tions (Plag & Pearlman, 2009). 
Monitoring is important because the risks posed 
by extreme geohazards are so large – both in terms 
of the immediate fallout and of multi-year climate 
change – that they ideally would be known years 
in advance of the actual event. A warning period 
of several years would be enough to increase food 
reserves and perform the agricultural research nec-
essary to maintain adequate crop yields in a sharply 
colder climate and potentially modiﬁed water cycle. 
Recent research has made attempts to improve 
forecasting of major eruptions (Druitt et al., 2012; 
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toring network of the IMS consists of 60 stations 
distributed worldwide. Most of these stations have 
been built and are currently fully operational, send-
ing data to the CTBTO International Data Centre 
(Vienna, Austria) in compliance with extremely 
strict requirements for data quality, data avail-
ability and data transmission from the station to 
the International Data Centre. The contribution 
of the IMS Infrasound component of the CTBT 
Network to volcano monitoring has been proven to 
be essential in the last decade. The CTBTO provides 
its Member States, as well as the international and 
national institutions responsible for aviation safety, 
with all the relevant information to enabling early 
warnings to be issued. 
Volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunamis are 
regularly recorded by IMS seismic and hydroa-
coustic stations. Following the 2004 Great Sumatra 
earthquake and tsunami, the CTBTO provides 
information in near real-time to tsunami warning 
centres, in particular those covering the Paciﬁc and 
Indian Oceans, to help them issue more timely and 
precise warnings. At present, tsunami warning cen-
tres in 11 countries with a high tsunami risk receive 
data from around 110 CTBTO stations. 
The recent report of the UNISDR ‘Progress and 
Challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction’ provides 
under Priority area 2, Core indicator 2.3 area a gen-
eral overview of the existing early warning systems 
distributed worldwide and analyses the major chal-
lenges associated with these systems. The report also 
highlights the fact that most early warning systems 
are in place for ﬂoods, cyclones, earthquakes, tsuna-
mis and droughts (UNISDR, 2014). This implies that 
there is an urgent need for consolidating a global 
monitoring network for volcanoes capable of issu-
ing early warnings not only in areas locally affected 
by volcanic eruptions, but also in areas which could 
suffer on a regional and global scale from the conse-
quences of major or extreme volcanic eruptions. The 
CTBTO IMS infrasound network can play a crucial 
role in this context. 
In conclusion, the CTBTO IMS network is capa-
ble of providing a crucial contribution to monitoring 
natural hazards and issuing early warnings thanks 
to the simultaneous acquisition of high-quality data 
from stations based on four different technolo-
gies, distributed worldwide and transmitting data 
in near real-time to a single reference point, the 
International Data Centre. This unique character-
istic puts the CTBTO in a key position to facilitate 
progress in DRR and to contribute to resilient com-
munities and sustainable development. 
CTBTO might also play a key role in facilitating 
the full integration of all the existing local, regional 
vide data to public data archives (see http://geodesy.
unr.edu/billhammond/gpsnetmap/GPSNetMap.
html). Combining selected stations with SAR meas-
urements in a routine, low-latency analysis could 
provide a basis for a surface-displacement service 
as part of an early warning system. Moreover, such 
a service would have many other applications with 
immediate societal beneﬁts. 
In the last 15 years, the traditional systems for 
monitoring volcanoes have been complemented 
by infrasound, a re-emerging technology (after its 
quite extensive development during the 1950s). This 
technology detects acoustic waves propagating in 
the atmosphere with a frequency range below the 
audible threshold (Gossard & Hooke, 1975; Evers 
& Haak, 2009). Infrasound has great potential for 
volcano monitoring since volcanoes inject a large 
part of their energy into the atmosphere, generating 
infrasound waves. Infrasound monitoring provides 
a signiﬁcant insight into the characteristics of vol-
canic eruptions, often going beyond the information 
retrievable through traditional monitoring tech-
nologies (Campus & Christie, 2009). Infrasound 
monitoring constitutes, therefore, an extremely 
valuable tool to help issue early warnings to both 
populations and the civil aviation authorities in the 
case of volcanic eruptions (Chen & Christie, 1995). 
Additional applications of infrasound technology 
include monitoring of avalanches, landslides, mete-
ors (ReVelle, 2009; Edwards, 2009), severe storms 
(Garcés et al., 2009; Hetzer et al., 2009), auroras 
(Wilson et al., 2009) and earthquakes (Mikumo & 
Watada, 2009), as well as speciﬁc atmospheric stud-
ies (Kulichkov, 2009; Le Pichon et al., 2009; Blanc 
et al., 2009; Drob et al., 2009). These latter studies 
have the potential of generating signiﬁcant progress 
in the modelling of the atmosphere and improving 
the accuracy of short- and medium-range weather 
forecasts. 
Infrasound technology is today supported not 
only by a number of local networks but primarily 
by a global network. The International Monitoring 
System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO), comprising 
seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionu-
clide stations with a total of 337 facilities, has been 
designed to detect all nuclear explosions, but is capa-
ble of signiﬁcantly contributing to the detection 
and monitoring of natural phenomena, including 
climate change (CTBTO Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization, 2008) and, in particular, hazard-
ous events (CTBTO Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization, 2011). The global infrasound moni-
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and global monitoring networks based on the four 
IMS monitoring technologies. This role also might 
be instrumental in generating a close synergy with 
the European Commission (which recently pub-
lished the Joint Research Centre’s Report ‘Science for 
Disaster Risk Reduction’, European Commission, 
Joint Research Centre, 2014), with UNISDR and 
with the GEO, thus facilitating the achievement of 
common targets in DRR and the establishment of 
the Global Earth Observation System of Systems 
(GEOSS). In this synergetic scenario the future 
delivery of sufﬁciently advanced early warnings 
might become more streamlined, thus helping to 
save life and property even in the case of extreme 
geohazards. 
An example of an important recent devel-
opment in this context is the decision by the 
European Strategy Forum for Large Scale Scientiﬁc 
Infrastructure (ESFRI) to include the European 
Plate Observing System (EPOS) in its implemen-
tation plan (see http://www.epos-eu.org) for the 
coming ﬁve years. EPOS is integrating the diverse 
but advanced European research infrastructures for 
solid Earth science, with a total value of 500 million 
euro. EPOS will build on new e-science opportuni-
ties to monitor and understand the dynamic and 
complex solid Earth system. EPOS will identify 
existing gaps and promote implementation plans 
with environmental, marine and space science to 
help solve the grand challenges facing the Earth and 
its people. 
Integration of existing national and trans-
national research infrastructures will increase access 
and use of the multidisciplinary data recorded by the 
solid Earth monitoring networks, acquired in labora-
tory experiments and/or produced by computational 
simulations. Establishment of EPOS will foster 
worldwide interoperability in the Earth sciences and 
services among a broad community of users. 
The social impact of the activities promoted and 
coordinated in EPOS in terms of disaster preven-
tion and mitigation is evident. Indeed, open access 
to the multidisciplinary research infrastructure as 
well as the prompt and continuous availability of 
high quality data will not only stimulate innova-
tive research on the Earth dynamics and processes 
that lead to catastrophic events, but will lead to new 
developments in disaster prevention research, and 
is therefore invaluable for improving hazard assess-
ment and forecasting. The EPOS infrastructure will 
contribute to information, dissemination, education 
and training.
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48 age scientiﬁc investment. They also include how 
to mobilise all sectors at the scale that is commen-
surate with the scale of the extreme geohazards 
and their impacts. In particular, developing and 
engaging with a process for integrating science in 
decision-making is crucial. 
Although in the last few decades earthquakes 
have been the main cause of fatalities and dam-
age, the main global risk is large volcanic eruptions 
that are less frequent but far more impactful than 
the largest earthquakes. Due to their far-reaching 
effects on climate, food security, transportation, 
and supply chains, these events have the potential to 
trigger global disaster and catastrophe. The cost of 
response and the ability to respond to these events 
is beyond the ﬁnancial and political capabilities of 
any individual country. An international geopoliti-
cal response will be required, where science has a 
unique and key role in preparation, response and 
mitigation. 
Many cascading events are not likely to be pre-
dicted by science or to be included in the scientiﬁc 
discourse. To understand cascading hazards and 
cascading effects, it will be necessary to learn from 
past disasters (becoming antifragile; Taleb, 2012) 
and to explore the weaknesses of modern society 
through simulation of extreme events. 
Why are we not prepared for extreme events? 
Reasons for this include the low perceived likeli-
hood of such an event, low political sensitivity, and 
a disconnect between scientiﬁc communities and 
decision-makers; reasons for the lack of socially 
acceptable strategies include the cost of preparing 
for an extreme hazard, and, in some cases, the belief 
that consequences are so extreme that preparedness 
is futile. What is not among these reasons is a lack 
of scientiﬁc knowledge. 
Geohazards cause large and increasing loss of life 
and property. The recent major geohazards that have 
caused disasters with global impacts are dwarfed 
by the largest geohazards that occurred during the 
Holocene. The potential impact on society of any 
such rare event tends to be ignored in the planning 
of land use, infrastructure, and socio-economic 
processes. While communities from the local to the 
global level learn increasingly to cope with the more 
frequent hazards, this does not imply that there is 
increasing resilience to low-probability high-impact 
events. 
The recent extreme disasters have revealed gaps 
in the knowledge of geohazards available to pol-
icy- and decision-makers. Understanding the full 
spectrum of geohazards, including extreme events, 
is a prerequisite for disaster risk management and 
increased global resilience to these events. Reducing 
the disasters induced by the occurrence of extreme 
hazards at an acceptable economic cost requires 
a solid scientiﬁc understanding of the hazards. 
Although many scientiﬁc questions still need to be 
answered, the disasters are rarely the result of a lack 
of science. Rather, they often result from the lack of 
a process for understanding the available scientiﬁc 
knowledge and for using it in decision-making. 
Therefore, there is a need to move to a global sci-
ence-based framework that would contribute to risk 
management for extreme hazards. 
Human activities do not drive the occurrence 
of extreme geohazards, and humans have basically 
no – or very limited – means to prevent the occur-
rence of such events, especially volcanic eruptions. 
Choices need to be made on whether to prepare for 
extreme geohazards and how to respond to them 
(Stein and Stein, 2014). These choices include how 
much to invest in science and how to best lever-
7. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
l l l
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no such scientiﬁc framework is available to assess 
the knowledge on global threats resulting from 
modern society being exposed to low-probability 
high-impact events. 
•	It is recommended that a better understanding be 
gained of the interrelation between topography, 
geohazards and the environment. The temporal 
evolution of topography needs to be assessed, not 
only during the recent past but also during the last 
10 or so million years. There are however some 
complex problems inherent to paleo-topography 
analysis. Apart from dealing with topography 
that no longer exists, the dimensions and timing 
of events and the underlying dynamic processes 
that controlled topographic development, as well 
as the topographic life cycle, pose major chal-
lenges, the complexity of which cannot be solved 
by a single sub-discipline but requires support by 
other disciplines. 
•	It is recommended that scenario contingency 
planning be used to better understand the threats 
and reduce risk. For this, a few speciﬁc or generic 
extreme geohazards should be selected. A meth-
odological and rational scientiﬁc analysis of event 
scenarios, including likely worst case scenarios, 
should be developed in cooperation with stake-
holders and decision makers. A goal should be 
to work through the cascading hazards and out-
comes identiﬁed by science and those recognised 
by stakeholders. The existing political opportuni-
ties and constraints, including the difﬁculties of 
implementation and the cost of not implementing, 
should be assessed. Options should be developed 
for how to manage the situation with the resources 
that will be available, rather than those that the 
scenario dictates should be available. 
•	It is recommended that risk awareness be increased 
in the population through dissemination of con-
cise and clear information on the risk associated 
with hazards and through training for coping with 
emergency scenarios.
•	It is recommended that a global monitoring sys-
tem be put in place with the goal of providing early 
warning for emerging extreme volcanic eruptions. 
Two core elements of this monitoring system 
would be the operational monitoring of solid 
Earth surface displacements and of infrasound 
waves. Both monitoring components would have 
major societal beneﬁts besides the early detection 
of emerging extreme eruptions. 
•	It is considered important to develop an informed 
global governance structure that could respond 
to emerging global threats and coordinate global 
measures to increase preparedness and resilience 
and reduce the risk of global disasters. In this con-
Risk awareness and monitoring is highly uneven 
across the world. As a result, potential hazards are 
much more closely monitored in wealthy countries 
than in the developing world. The global nature of 
extreme hazards requires as much forewarning as 
possible to develop an effective response. The disas-
ters and near-misses of the past show that adherence 
to scientiﬁc knowledge, particularly during the early 
warning phase, can reduce disasters. This suggests 
that a strong global monitoring system for geo-
hazards is needed, not least to support the early 
detection of extreme hazards. 
Low risk-awareness combined with poverty, cor-
ruption, and a lack of building codes and informed 
land use management creates the conditions to 
turn hazards into disasters throughout much of the 
developing world. Democratising knowledge about 
extreme geohazards is very important in order to 
inform deliberations on disaster risks and commu-
nity strategies that can reduce the disaster risk by 
increasing resilience and adaptive capacities without 
compromising the livelihood of communities. 
A key element in DRR aimed at extreme geohaz-
ards is a volcano monitoring system. Such a system 
would not only be capable of providing timely warn-
ings for looming extreme events but would also 
improve the observational database for urgently 
needed research on extreme hazards. Likewise, the 
system would improve the timely detection of more 
frequent geohazards, and it would provide a basis 
for improved early warnings. 
For some eruptions, lead times are extremely 
short and DRR will require a reduction in sensi-
tivity of infrastructure, an increase in community 
resilience, including risk awareness across the 
community, and adaptive capabilities to cope with 
potentially large long-term changes in environmen-
tal conditions. There are several core elements that 
are needed to address the global risk from extreme 
geohazards: 
•	It is recommended that a joint international and 
synergistic effort be made to establish a global 
scientiﬁc framework for strategic extreme geohaz-
ard science. This framework should be capable of 
delivering a tactical scientiﬁc response to hazards 
and extreme hazards. It should also seamlessly 
integrate and up-date science into warning, pre-
paredness, mitigation and responses that are 
implemented by governments, communities, and 
the private sector on a global scale in order to min-
imise the detrimental global impacts of extreme 
geohazards. Such a framework could take into 
account lessons learned from NEO tracking in 
terms of monitoring and from the IPCC model 
in terms of knowledge assessment. As of today, 
Ex
tr
em
e 
Ge
oh
az
ar
ds
: R
ed
uc
in
g 
th
e 
Di
sa
st
er
 R
is
k 
an
d 
In
cr
ea
si
n
g 
Re
si
li
en
ce
50
text, the recommended framework for strategic 
extreme geohazards science (and science for other 
extreme hazards) would inform the global govern-
ance system of any impending risk, and scenario 
contingency planning would provide guidance for 
disaster risk management. 
As an immediate step to support research into early 
warning, it is also recommended that the Charter 
on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated 
Use of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or 
Technological Disasters (see https://www.disas-
terscharter.org) be extended to cover cases where 
access to data could increase preparedness or where 
a looming extreme hazard might cause a disaster. 
The current charter only applies to cases where 
the disaster has already happened and has created 
a crisis. In the case of a disaster, the charter can 
be activated to give access to comprehensive data 
archives. For extreme geohazards, having access to 
data during the phase where the hazardous event is 
developing could lead to a better understanding of 
the potential for an extreme event and inform deci-
sions to prepare for such an event. 
Ex
tr
em
e 
Ge
oh
az
ar
ds
: R
ed
uc
in
g 
th
e 
Di
sa
st
er
 R
is
k 
an
d 
In
cr
ea
si
n
g 
Re
si
li
en
ce
51
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
AIDA Asteroid Impact and Deﬂection 
Assessment 
AIM Asteroid Impact Mission 
ATWC Alaska Tsunami Warning Center 
CBA Cost-beneﬁt analysis 
CCP Cities for Climate Protection 
CGNSS Continuous GNSS 
COST European Cooperation in Science and 
Technology 
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty 
Organization 
DART Double Asteroid Redirect Test 
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction 
D3R Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience 
EPOS European Plate Observing System 
ESF European Science Foundation 
ESFRI European Strategy Forum for Large Scale 
Scientiﬁc Infrastructure 
GEM Global Earthquake Model 
GEO Group on Earth Observations 
GEOSS Global Earth Observation System of 
Systems 
GHCP Geohazards Community of Practice 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
GSN Global Seismographic Network 
IAWN International Asteroid Warning Network 
ICAO International Civil Aviation 
Organization 
IDD International Disaster Database 
IGOS-P Integrated Global Observing Strategy 
Partnership 
IMS International Monitoring System 
InSAR Interferometric Synthetic Aperture 
Radar 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 
IRIS Incorporated Research Institutions for 
Seismology 
NEO Near-Earth Object 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
NWSv  National Weather Service 
PDF Probability Density Function 
PTWC Paciﬁc Tsunami Warning Center 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SMPAG Space Missions Planning Advisory 
Group 
UNISDR United Nations Ofﬁce for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 
VAAC Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers 
VEI Volcanic Explosivity Index 
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Recurrence	interval:	
in the context of X-events, recurrence interval is 
used to refer to the likelihood of an event occurring 
at least once anywhere on Earth within the given 
period.
Resilience: 
the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to 
changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and 
recover rapidly from disruptions.
Risk: 
here the term is used to denote the value that is 
likely to be lost due to a hazard. It is the product of 
hazard probability, vulnerability of an exposed asset 
to the hazard, and the value of the asset.
Threat:
 is the product of ‘intent’ and ‘capability’ to inﬂict 
harm. In the context of natural hazards, the intent 
is the probability of the event taking place, and the 
capability is the damage the event can cause.
Vulnerability: 
here the term is used to denote a characteristic of an 
asset to experience damage if exposed to a hazard. 
The study of the vulnerability of human and natural 
systems to hazards is a relatively new interdiscipli-
nary ﬁeld, which is developing particularly with a 
view on climate effects and other natural hazards. A 
common language has not been developed yet, and 
experts from different ﬁeld put different meanings 
to the terms used (e.g., Dolan & Walker, 2003). In 
particular, approaches differ between the natural 
and social sciences (e.g. Brooks, 2003).
X-event: 
an event that is rare, surprising, and has potentially 
huge impacts on human life. An outlier outside the 
‘normal’ region that could lead to “the collapse of 
everything” (Casti, 2012).
Anthropogenic	hazard: 
a hazard resulting primarily from human actions or 
originating in the built environment. These include, 
but are not limited to, wars, terrorism, accidents, 
infrastructure failure, mismanagement of resources, 
and economic downturns. With increasing impact 
of human actions on the planet, the distinc-
tion between anthropogenic and natural hazards 
becomes less clear.
Disaster: 
a serious disruption of the functioning of a com-
munity or a society involving widespread human, 
material, economic or environmental losses and 
impacts.
Geohazard: 
a hazard that involves geological processes at a wide 
range of spatial and temporal scales. In the context 
of this paper, the deﬁnition of geohazards is broad 
and covers all hazards that originate or interact with 
the solid Earth, including earthquakes, landslides, 
tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, ﬂoods, droughts, heat 
waves, and bolides.
Hazard: 
a situation that poses a threat to life, health, prop-
erty, or environment. In the context of this paper, 
the term hazard is also used to denote the incidence 
of hazardous events. In some scientiﬁc disciplines, 
hazard is deﬁned as the probability of an event to 
occur. Here, we use hazard to denote a situation that 
would pose a threat if it occurred independent of 
the probability of its occurrence. Thus, a very large 
volcanic eruption is considered an extreme hazard, 
independent of the probability of the eruption actu-
ally occurring.
Natural	hazard: 
a hazard that is caused by a natural event. Besides 
geohazards as deﬁned above, this includes, among 
others, storms, viruses, solar storms, and cosmic 
radiation.
Preparedness: 
actions taken to plan, organise, equip, train, and 
exercise to build, apply, and sustain the capabilities 
necessary to prevent, protect against, ameliorate 
the effects of, respond to, and recover from climate-
change-related damage to life, health, property, 
livelihoods, ecosystems, and national security.
Appendix A: Glossary
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Table 8. Overview of known earthquakes during the last 2,000 years up to 2012.
Appendix B: Overview of Earthquakes in the Last 2,000 Years
Date Location Latitude Longitude Magnitude Fatalities Notes
19 May 526 Antioch, Turkey 8 250,000 The city of Antioch was greatly damaged, and some decades later the city’s population 
was just 300,000. Fire destroyed most of the buildings.
22 December 856 Qumis, Iran 36.23 54.14 45,000-200,000 The city of Damghan was half destroyed and had 45,096 casualties.
13 July 869 Sendai, Japan 38.5 143.8 8.6 ~1,000 Triggered a tsunami which caused wide spread flooding of the Sendai plain.
23 March 893 Ardabil, Iran 38.28 48.30 – 150,000
11 October 1138 Aleppo, Syria 36.1 36.8 11
20 September 1498 Honshu, Japan 34.0 138.1 8.6 thousands Triggered a large tsunami. The death toll associated with this event is uncertain, but 
between 26,000 and 31,000 casualties were reported.
23 January 1556 Shaanxi, China 34.5 109.7 8.2-8.3 830,000+ More than 97 counties in the provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Gansu, Hebei, 
Shandong, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu and Anhui were affected. An 840 km wide area was 
destroyed, and in some counties 60% of the population was killed.
16 December 1575 Valdivia, Chile -39.8 -73.2 8.5 Caused the subsequent flood of Valdivia due to river disruption.
24 November 1604 Arica, Chile -18.5 -70.4 8.5 ~ 51-100
20 October 1687 Lima, Peru -15.2 -75.9 8.2 5,000 Caused severe damage to Lima, Callao and Ica. It triggered a tsunami that killed most of 
the people.
26 January 1700 Cascadia, North America 9 Triggered a tsunami that struck the coast of Japan.
31 December 1703 Kanto Region, Japan 35.0 140.0 8.2 5,233 Shook Edo and killed 2,300 people due to the shaking and subsequent fire. It triggered a 
major tsunami (10 m maximum in some areas) which increased the death toll to at least 
5,233 but probably up to 10,000.
28 October 1707 Hoel, Japan 33.0 136.0 8.6 5,000+ Caused moderate to severe damage throughout Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. Triggered a 
tsunami (up to 10 m in some place), which resulted in more than 5000 casualties.
8 July 1730 Valparaiso, Chile -32.5 -71.5 8.7 Triggered a major tsunami that inundated the lower parts of Valparaiso. It caused damage 
from Serena to Chillan. Tsunami had a maximum run up height of 16 m.
25 May 1751 Concepcion, Chile -36.83 -73.03 8.5 ~ 65 Destroyed the cities of Concepcion, Chillan, Cauquenes, Curico and Talca. Changed the 
course of the river some 15 blocks.
1 November 1755 Lisbon, Portugal 36 -11 8.7 80,000 Caused fires and triggered a huge tsunami. Almost totally destroyed Lisbon and adjoining 
areas. According to http://tsun.sscc.ru/ttt_rep.htm 40,000 died due to tsunami..
25 November 1833 Sumatra, East India  
(now Indonesia)
-2.5 100.5 8.8–9.2 numerous Triggered a huge tsunami flooded all southern part of western Sumatra from Pariaman to 
Bengkulu. Also damage in the Seychelles.
13 August 1868 Arica, Chile -18.50 -70.35 9.0 25,000 A tsunami (or multiple tsunamis) in the Pacific Ocean was produced by the earthquake, 
which was recorded in Hawaii, Japan and New Zealand. 3,000 died by tsunami according 
to http://tsun.sscc.ru/ttt_rep.htm
10 May 1877 Iquique, Chile -19.6 -70.23 8.8 2,541 Triggered a devastating tsunami. A total of 2,541 people died, mainly in Peru and what is 
now northernmost Chile, with some deaths also reported from Hawaii and Japan.
31 January 1906 Colombia–Ecuador 1 -81.5 8.8 1,000 Triggered a destructive tsunami. The maximum recorded run-up height was 5 m in 
Tumaco, Colombia. At Hilo, Hawaii a 1.8 m run-up height was recorded for this event.  
The tsunami was also noted in Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, California and Japan.
28 December 1908 Messina and Reggio Calabria, Italy 38.3 15.6 7.2 70,000 Reggio on the Italian mainland also suffered heavy damage. Moments after the earth-
quake, a 12 m tsunami struck nearby coasts, causing even more devastation; 91% of 
structures in Messina were destroyed and some 70,000 residents were killed.
16 December 1920 Ningxia-Gansu, China 36.6 105.32 8.6 235,502 A landslide buried the village of Sujiahe in Xiji County. More than 30,000 people were killed 
in Guyuan County. Nearly all the houses collapsed in the cities of Longde and Huining.
11 November 1922 Atacama Region, Chile -28.5 -70.0 8.5 100s The earthquake caused extensive damage from Copiapo to Coquimbo. It triggered a 
destructive tsunami (max 7 m high) that caused significant damage to the coast of Chile 
and was observed as far away as Australia. The tsunami killed several hundred people in 
coastal cities, especially in Coquimbo.
3 February 1923 Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia 54 161 8.5 Triggered an 8 m tsunami that caused considerable damage in Kamchatka, with a number 
of reported deaths. The tsunami was still 6 m high when it reached Hawaii, causing at least 
one fatality.
1 September 1923 Kanto Region, Japan 35.4 139.0 7.9 143,000 Earthquake devastated Tokyo, the port city of Yokohama, surrounding prefectures of 
Chiba, Kanagawa, and Shizuoka, and caused widespread damage throughout the Kantō 
region. A tsunami with waves up to 10 m high struck the coast of Sagami Bay, Boso 
Peninsula, Izu Islands and the east coast of Izu Peninsula within minutes. The tsunami 
killed many, including about 100 people along Yui-ga-hama beach in Kamakura and an 
estimated 50 people on the Enoshima causeway. Over 570,000 homes were destroyed, 
leaving an estimated 1.9 million homeless. 
Tsunami and fire caused most deaths.
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Appendix B: Overview of Earthquakes in the Last 2,000 Years
Date Location Latitude Longitude Magnitude Fatalities Notes
19 May 526 Antioch, Turkey 8 250,000 The city of Antioch was greatly damaged, and some decades later the city’s population 
was just 300,000. Fire destroyed most of the buildings.
22 December 856 Qumis, Iran 36.23 54.14 45,000-200,000 The city of Damghan was half destroyed and had 45,096 casualties.
13 July 869 Sendai, Japan 38.5 143.8 8.6 ~1,000 Triggered a tsunami which caused wide spread flooding of the Sendai plain.
23 March 893 Ardabil, Iran 38.28 48.30 – 150,000
11 October 1138 Aleppo, Syria 36.1 36.8 11
20 September 1498 Honshu, Japan 34.0 138.1 8.6 thousands Triggered a large tsunami. The death toll associated with this event is uncertain, but 
between 26,000 and 31,000 casualties were reported.
23 January 1556 Shaanxi, China 34.5 109.7 8.2-8.3 830,000+ More than 97 counties in the provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Gansu, Hebei, 
Shandong, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu and Anhui were affected. An 840 km wide area was 
destroyed, and in some counties 60% of the population was killed.
16 December 1575 Valdivia, Chile -39.8 -73.2 8.5 Caused the subsequent flood of Valdivia due to river disruption.
24 November 1604 Arica, Chile -18.5 -70.4 8.5 ~ 51-100
20 October 1687 Lima, Peru -15.2 -75.9 8.2 5,000 Caused severe damage to Lima, Callao and Ica. It triggered a tsunami that killed most of 
the people.
26 January 1700 Cascadia, North America 9 Triggered a tsunami that struck the coast of Japan.
31 December 1703 Kanto Region, Japan 35.0 140.0 8.2 5,233 Shook Edo and killed 2,300 people due to the shaking and subsequent fire. It triggered a 
major tsunami (10 m maximum in some areas) which increased the death toll to at least 
5,233 but probably up to 10,000.
28 October 1707 Hoel, Japan 33.0 136.0 8.6 5,000+ Caused moderate to severe damage throughout Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. Triggered a 
tsunami (up to 10 m in some place), which resulted in more than 5000 casualties.
8 July 1730 Valparaiso, Chile -32.5 -71.5 8.7 Triggered a major tsunami that inundated the lower parts of Valparaiso. It caused damage 
from Serena to Chillan. Tsunami had a maximum run up height of 16 m.
25 May 1751 Concepcion, Chile -36.83 -73.03 8.5 ~ 65 Destroyed the cities of Concepcion, Chillan, Cauquenes, Curico and Talca. Changed the 
course of the river some 15 blocks.
1 November 1755 Lisbon, Portugal 36 -11 8.7 80,000 Caused fires and triggered a huge tsunami. Almost totally destroyed Lisbon and adjoining 
areas. According to http://tsun.sscc.ru/ttt_rep.htm 40,000 died due to tsunami..
25 November 1833 Sumatra, East India  
(now Indonesia)
-2.5 100.5 8.8–9.2 numerous Triggered a huge tsunami flooded all southern part of western Sumatra from Pariaman to 
Bengkulu. Also damage in the Seychelles.
13 August 1868 Arica, Chile -18.50 -70.35 9.0 25,000 A tsunami (or multiple tsunamis) in the Pacific Ocean was produced by the earthquake, 
which was recorded in Hawaii, Japan and New Zealand. 3,000 died by tsunami according 
to http://tsun.sscc.ru/ttt_rep.htm
10 May 1877 Iquique, Chile -19.6 -70.23 8.8 2,541 Triggered a devastating tsunami. A total of 2,541 people died, mainly in Peru and what is 
now northernmost Chile, with some deaths also reported from Hawaii and Japan.
31 January 1906 Colombia–Ecuador 1 -81.5 8.8 1,000 Triggered a destructive tsunami. The maximum recorded run-up height was 5 m in 
Tumaco, Colombia. At Hilo, Hawaii a 1.8 m run-up height was recorded for this event.  
The tsunami was also noted in Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, California and Japan.
28 December 1908 Messina and Reggio Calabria, Italy 38.3 15.6 7.2 70,000 Reggio on the Italian mainland also suffered heavy damage. Moments after the earth-
quake, a 12 m tsunami struck nearby coasts, causing even more devastation; 91% of 
structures in Messina were destroyed and some 70,000 residents were killed.
16 December 1920 Ningxia-Gansu, China 36.6 105.32 8.6 235,502 A landslide buried the village of Sujiahe in Xiji County. More than 30,000 people were killed 
in Guyuan County. Nearly all the houses collapsed in the cities of Longde and Huining.
11 November 1922 Atacama Region, Chile -28.5 -70.0 8.5 100s The earthquake caused extensive damage from Copiapo to Coquimbo. It triggered a 
destructive tsunami (max 7 m high) that caused significant damage to the coast of Chile 
and was observed as far away as Australia. The tsunami killed several hundred people in 
coastal cities, especially in Coquimbo.
3 February 1923 Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia 54 161 8.5 Triggered an 8 m tsunami that caused considerable damage in Kamchatka, with a number 
of reported deaths. The tsunami was still 6 m high when it reached Hawaii, causing at least 
one fatality.
1 September 1923 Kanto Region, Japan 35.4 139.0 7.9 143,000 Earthquake devastated Tokyo, the port city of Yokohama, surrounding prefectures of 
Chiba, Kanagawa, and Shizuoka, and caused widespread damage throughout the Kantō 
region. A tsunami with waves up to 10 m high struck the coast of Sagami Bay, Boso 
Peninsula, Izu Islands and the east coast of Izu Peninsula within minutes. The tsunami 
killed many, including about 100 people along Yui-ga-hama beach in Kamakura and an 
estimated 50 people on the Enoshima causeway. Over 570,000 homes were destroyed, 
leaving an estimated 1.9 million homeless. 
Tsunami and fire caused most deaths.
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Appendix B: Overview of Earthquakes in the Last 2,000 Years 
Date Location Latitude Longitude Magnitude Fatalities Notes
1 April 1946 Unimak Island, Alaska,  
United States.
52.75 -163.5 8.6 165 
(due to low population density)
Triggered a pacific wide tsunami. 159 of the casualties occurred in Hilo, Hawaii.  
It obliterated Unimak island.
15 August 1950 Assam, Tibet 28.5 96.5 8.6 1,526 The earthquake was destructive in both Assam and Tibet, and 1,526 people were killed. 
Also the largest known earthquake to have not been caused by an oceanic subduction. 
Instead, this quake was caused by two continental plates converging.
4 November 1952 Kamchatka, Russia 52.76 160.06 9 ~1,000 
Sources vary widely
Triggered a large tsunami causing destruction and loss of life on the Kamchatka Peninsula. 
Impacted Hawaii causing US$1,000,000 damage, but no deaths. http://earthquakes.
sciencedaily.com/l/3519/Russia-Kamchatka-Peninsula. According to http://tsun.sscc.ru/
ttt_rep.htm there were more than 10,000 deaths caused by the tsunami.
9 March 1957 Andreanof Island, Alaska,  
United States
51.56 -175.39 8.6 0  
(due to low population density)
Triggered a tsunami that reached 16 m and caused $5,000,000 in damage in Hawaii 
destroying two villages on Oahu. Death toll zero (http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/world-s-
biggest-earthquakes-since-1900-3384698).
22 May 1960 Valdivia, Chile -38.24 -73.05 9.5 5,700 Tremors caused landslides and triggered a major tsunami (26ft and 35ft) affecting 
southern Chile, Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines eastern New Zealand, southeast Australia, 
Aleutian island Alaska. Tsunami killed ~1,180 people in Chile according to http://tsun.sscc.
ru/ttt_rep.htm.
13 October 1963 Kuril Islands 44.81 149.54 8.5 Triggered a 4.5 m tsunami.
28 March 1964 Prince William Sound, Alaska, 
United States
61.02 -147.65 9.2 125 
(due to low population density)
Anchorage sustained great destruction or damage to many inadequately engineered 
houses, buildings, and infrastructure. Nearby, a 27-foot (8.2 m) tsunami destroyed the 
village of Chenega, killing 23 of the 68 people who lived there; survivors out-ran the wave, 
climbing to high ground. Post-quake tsunamis severely affected Whittier, Seward, Kodiak, 
and other Alaskan communities, as well as people and property in British Columbia, 
Oregon, and California. Tsunamis also caused damage in Hawaii and Japan.
4 February 1965 Rat Island, Alaska,  
United States
51.21 -178.5 8.7 0  
(due to low population density)
Triggered a tsunami of over 10 m on Shemya Island and 2 m at Amchika Island but caused 
little damage. It was observed at Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, California, Japan and Eastern 
Russia.
27 July 1976 Tangshan, China 39.61 117.89 7.6 242,419 More than half a month before the earthquake struck, Wang Chengamin of the State 
Seismological Bureau (SSB) Analysis and Prediction Department had already concluded 
that the Tangshan region would be struck by a significant earthquake between July 22, 
1976 and August 5, 1976
26 December 2004 Sumatra, Indonesia,  
Indian Ocean
3.30 95.87 9.1 230,000-3000,000 Most people died due to the huge tsunami created.
28 March 2005 Nias Region, Indonesia 2.085 97.108 8.6 1,303 Triggered a small tsunami. Most people were killed by the earthquake (1300).
12 September 2007 Sumatra, Indonesia -4.517 101.382 8.5 25 Many buildings collapsed on the west coast of Sumatra. At least 25 dead, and over a 
hundred injured. Tsunami alert issued for the entire Indian Ocean Region but tsunamis 
were small. Max 1 m.
12 January 2010 Port-au-Prince, Haiti 18.451 -72.445 7.0 230,000-316,000 Worst earthquake in region in 200 years.
27 February 2010 Maule, Chile -35.84 -72.72 8.8 523 Triggered a tsunami which devastated several coastal towns in south-central Chile and 
damaged the port at Talcahuano. Minor damage in San Diego, California.
11 March 2011 Japan Region  
(Tohoku earthquake)
38.32 142.37 9.0 15,870 Triggered a huge tsunami. Centred closest to Enoshima, Miyagi, at a depth of 32 km. Most 
damage occurred in Sendai. Damage occurred in Fukushima, Iwate and Miyagi due to 
tsunamis. 
Tsunami reached height of 40.5 m in Miyako. Travelled up to 10km inland in the Sendai 
area. Earthquake moved Honshu (the main island) 2.4 m east and shifted the Earth figure 
axis by estimated 10 cm to 25 cm.
11 April 2012 Northern Sumatra,  
Indian Ocean
2.31 
0.77
93.06 
92.45
8.6 
8.2
10 Centred 434 km SW of Banda Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia, at a depth of 22.9 km. 
Centred 618 km SSW of Banda Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia, at a depth of 16.4 km.  
10 dead due to heart attacks and shock. Triggered only small tsunamis.
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Appendix B: Overview of Earthquakes in the Last 2,000 Years 
Date Location Latitude Longitude Magnitude Fatalities Notes
1 April 1946 Unimak Island, Alaska,  
United States.
52.75 -163.5 8.6 165 
(due to low population density)
Triggered a pacific wide tsunami. 159 of the casualties occurred in Hilo, Hawaii.  
It obliterated Unimak island.
15 August 1950 Assam, Tibet 28.5 96.5 8.6 1,526 The earthquake was destructive in both Assam and Tibet, and 1,526 people were killed. 
Also the largest known earthquake to have not been caused by an oceanic subduction. 
Instead, this quake was caused by two continental plates converging.
4 November 1952 Kamchatka, Russia 52.76 160.06 9 ~1,000 
Sources vary widely
Triggered a large tsunami causing destruction and loss of life on the Kamchatka Peninsula. 
Impacted Hawaii causing US$1,000,000 damage, but no deaths. http://earthquakes.
sciencedaily.com/l/3519/Russia-Kamchatka-Peninsula. According to http://tsun.sscc.ru/
ttt_rep.htm there were more than 10,000 deaths caused by the tsunami.
9 March 1957 Andreanof Island, Alaska,  
United States
51.56 -175.39 8.6 0  
(due to low population density)
Triggered a tsunami that reached 16 m and caused $5,000,000 in damage in Hawaii 
destroying two villages on Oahu. Death toll zero (http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/world-s-
biggest-earthquakes-since-1900-3384698).
22 May 1960 Valdivia, Chile -38.24 -73.05 9.5 5,700 Tremors caused landslides and triggered a major tsunami (26ft and 35ft) affecting 
southern Chile, Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines eastern New Zealand, southeast Australia, 
Aleutian island Alaska. Tsunami killed ~1,180 people in Chile according to http://tsun.sscc.
ru/ttt_rep.htm.
13 October 1963 Kuril Islands 44.81 149.54 8.5 Triggered a 4.5 m tsunami.
28 March 1964 Prince William Sound, Alaska, 
United States
61.02 -147.65 9.2 125 
(due to low population density)
Anchorage sustained great destruction or damage to many inadequately engineered 
houses, buildings, and infrastructure. Nearby, a 27-foot (8.2 m) tsunami destroyed the 
village of Chenega, killing 23 of the 68 people who lived there; survivors out-ran the wave, 
climbing to high ground. Post-quake tsunamis severely affected Whittier, Seward, Kodiak, 
and other Alaskan communities, as well as people and property in British Columbia, 
Oregon, and California. Tsunamis also caused damage in Hawaii and Japan.
4 February 1965 Rat Island, Alaska,  
United States
51.21 -178.5 8.7 0  
(due to low population density)
Triggered a tsunami of over 10 m on Shemya Island and 2 m at Amchika Island but caused 
little damage. It was observed at Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, California, Japan and Eastern 
Russia.
27 July 1976 Tangshan, China 39.61 117.89 7.6 242,419 More than half a month before the earthquake struck, Wang Chengamin of the State 
Seismological Bureau (SSB) Analysis and Prediction Department had already concluded 
that the Tangshan region would be struck by a significant earthquake between July 22, 
1976 and August 5, 1976
26 December 2004 Sumatra, Indonesia,  
Indian Ocean
3.30 95.87 9.1 230,000-3000,000 Most people died due to the huge tsunami created.
28 March 2005 Nias Region, Indonesia 2.085 97.108 8.6 1,303 Triggered a small tsunami. Most people were killed by the earthquake (1300).
12 September 2007 Sumatra, Indonesia -4.517 101.382 8.5 25 Many buildings collapsed on the west coast of Sumatra. At least 25 dead, and over a 
hundred injured. Tsunami alert issued for the entire Indian Ocean Region but tsunamis 
were small. Max 1 m.
12 January 2010 Port-au-Prince, Haiti 18.451 -72.445 7.0 230,000-316,000 Worst earthquake in region in 200 years.
27 February 2010 Maule, Chile -35.84 -72.72 8.8 523 Triggered a tsunami which devastated several coastal towns in south-central Chile and 
damaged the port at Talcahuano. Minor damage in San Diego, California.
11 March 2011 Japan Region  
(Tohoku earthquake)
38.32 142.37 9.0 15,870 Triggered a huge tsunami. Centred closest to Enoshima, Miyagi, at a depth of 32 km. Most 
damage occurred in Sendai. Damage occurred in Fukushima, Iwate and Miyagi due to 
tsunamis. 
Tsunami reached height of 40.5 m in Miyako. Travelled up to 10km inland in the Sendai 
area. Earthquake moved Honshu (the main island) 2.4 m east and shifted the Earth figure 
axis by estimated 10 cm to 25 cm.
11 April 2012 Northern Sumatra,  
Indian Ocean
2.31 
0.77
93.06 
92.45
8.6 
8.2
10 Centred 434 km SW of Banda Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia, at a depth of 22.9 km. 
Centred 618 km SSW of Banda Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia, at a depth of 16.4 km.  
10 dead due to heart attacks and shock. Triggered only small tsunamis.
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•	International programmes informing govern-
ments, decision makers, and the general public on 
disaster risks, and ways to reduce these risks, are 
being conducted; 
Realising	that:	
•	The loss of lives and properties through natural 
hazards, particularly geohazards, is rapidly increas-
ing due to a growing population expanding into 
hazardous areas; 
•	The direct and indirect consequences of extreme 
events are likely to increase as more population and 
infrastructure is put in harm’s way and the inter-
connectivity of global society increases; 
•	Few options exist to reduce geohazards, but expo-
sure and vulnerability can be reduced by properly 
choosing where to build and how, and by adapting 
existing buildings to potential hazards; 
•	Proper planning of land use, particularly in rapidly 
growing urban areas, is key to risk reduction; 
•	The failure to signiﬁcantly reduce the impacts 
of geohazards on society is partially due to a gap 
between science and research programmes and the 
communities in harm’s way; this gap also extends to 
many national, regional, and local decision makers; 
•	Disaster risk reduction rarely happens in com-
munities suffering from poverty, high levels of 
corruption, or opaque decision making; 
•	Adaptation to geohazards is hampered by an inad-
equate and inaccurate perception of the risks and 
a lack of publicly available and easy to understand, 
information; 
•	Research in the traditional academic disciplines 
faces structural challenges that discourage research 
projects integrating the natural and social sciences, 
disaster management professionals and planners, 
and the community exposed to the hazards; 
•	In many regions, rules, laws, and legislation facili-
tating a safe built environment are either absent, or 
enforcement is hampered by organisational obsta-
cles, including corruption; 
•	A large fraction of the death toll in disasters caused 
by geohazards is due to delayed or inefﬁcient 
response and rescue; 
Emphasising	the	importance	of	the	contribu-
tions	of	many	international	programmes	and	
organisations,	in	particular	that:	
•	The United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) aims to 
strengthen the role of science in disaster risk reduc-
Preamble 
Geohazards such as earthquakes, landslides, volcano 
eruptions and associated tsunamis and ﬂoods cause 
large and increasing loss of lives and property. Most 
of these losses occur during high-impact, extreme 
events. The global and long-lasting societal and eco-
nomic impacts of recent extreme events illustrate the 
scale of disasters that can be caused by geohazards, 
and remind us of the challenge of extreme events 
for disaster risk management. At the same time, 
the recent major geohazards causing disasters with 
global impacts are dwarfed by the largest geohaz-
ards that occurred during the last few millennia. 
The potential impact on our civilisation of any such 
rare event tends to be ignored in planning of land 
use, infrastructure, and socio-economic processes. 
The recent extreme disasters revealed gaps in the 
knowledge of geohazards available to policy- and 
decision-making. Understanding the full spec-
trum of geohazards, including the extreme events, 
is a prerequisite for disaster risk management and 
increased global resilience to these events. Reducing 
the disasters induced by the occurrence of extreme 
hazards at an acceptable economic cost requires a 
solid scientiﬁc understanding of the hazards. The 
current understanding of high-impact geohazards 
and the challenges posed to the disaster risk man-
agement cycle were reviewed during the European 
Science Foundation (ESF)–European Cooperation in 
Science and Technology (COST) high level research 
conference on ‘Understanding Extreme Geohazards: 
The Science of the Disaster Risk Management Cycle’, 
held on November 27 – December 2, 2011 in Sant 
Feliu de Guixols, Spain. 
The participants of this conference recognise the 
work done by the international geohazards commu-
nity and, in addressing the needs identiﬁed in the 
declaration, intend to build on this work, in particu-
lar on the 2007 Frascati Declaration of the Third 
International Workshop on Geohazards; the Road 
Map of the Geohazards Community of Practice 
(GHCP) of the Group on Earth Observations (GEO) 
developed in 2010, and the progress made since then. 
Recognising	that:
•	Major research efforts have been made to under-
stand the causes and processes of geohazards; 
•	Signiﬁcant advances have been achieved in our 
knowledge of the hazardous areas, and many meas-
ures required to prepare for, and adapt to, hazards 
have been developed; 
Appendix C: Declaration on Extreme Geohazards and the Reduction  
of Disaster Risks 
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•	A sustained geohazard monitoring system be 
implemented to provide observations for research, 
detection of hazardous events, and in support of 
disaster prevention, response and recovery; 
•	Data relevant to the monitoring and understand-
ing of geohazards be shared freely in support of 
geohazard research and disaster risk reduction; 
•	Interdisciplinary research programmes be devel-
oped which integrate the natural and social 
sciences to address all phases of the disaster risk 
management cycle; 
•	A dedicated outreach and education programme 
be developed to support a change in the citizens’ 
and authorities’ perception of the risks associated 
with major geohazards and to help recognise the 
challenges these hazards pose to society; 
•	Organised efforts and resources be dedicated to 
education at the local level, particularly in develop-
ing countries, where community-based educational 
programmes are effective ways to empower those 
in harm’s way to protect themselves from geohaz-
ards; 
•	Information on geohazards be disseminated so 
that relevant governmental bodies and citizens 
can make informed and transparent decisions on 
where to build what and how, and where to reduce 
the vulnerability of existing buildings to future 
hazards; 
•	State-of-the-art products be developed to help pol-
icy makers developing legislation for risk reduction 
and planning for a safe built environment; 
•	Preparedness and mitigation measures be tailored 
to speciﬁc local vulnerabilities, available resources, 
and social, cultural and religious constraints; 
•	International collaboration with local experts be 
fostered, to help regions with poorly developed 
governance mitigate disaster risks; 
•	Low-technology response and rescue capabilities be 
improved, particularly in developing countries, so 
that disaster-impacted populations can be reached 
more rapidly; 
•	A community-based white paper, addressing the 
scientiﬁc and societal challenges of increasing dis-
aster risk due to extreme geohazards, be prepared 
and distributed to funding agencies and govern-
mental and intergovernmental bodies;  
•	A process for an integrated assessment of disas-
ter risk due to geohazards be established and the 
results of this assessment be articulated through 
an authoritative scientiﬁc body (such as the IPCC).
tion through continued support of increasingly 
interdisciplinary inter-national research projects 
which include capacity building for team members 
and science education for the affected communi-
ties; 
•	The Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015) 
facilitates the implementation of measures to 
increase the resilience of nations and communi-
ties to disasters; 
•	The Group on Earth Observations (GEO) aims to 
provide the monitoring required to understand the 
natural hazards and to detect hazardous events in 
a timely manner; 
•	The Geohazards Community of Practice of GEO is 
developing the building blocks informing the four 
phases of the risk management cycle; i.e. prepared-
ness, early warning, response, and recovery; 
•	The United Nations Ofﬁce for Project Services 
(UNOPS) is developing natural disaster manage-
ment units blending research, monitoring, capacity 
building and education; 
•	The Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) 
Scientiﬁc Programme of the International 
Council of Science (ICSU) co-sponsored by the 
International Social Sciences Council (ISSC) and 
the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) is developing the 
scientiﬁc basis for risk reduction measures; 
•	Several international scientiﬁc unions, including 
the International Geographical Union (IGU), the 
Inter-national Society for Photogrammetry and 
Remote Sensing (ISPRS), the International Union 
of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG), and the 
International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS), 
promote basic research on geohazards, georisk, and 
sustainability via innovative multi- and trans-dis-
ciplinary research and outreach projects; 
•	The ESF has been facilitating a number of high 
level science conferences improving our under-
standing of the causes of disasters due to natural 
hazards; 
We,	the	participants	of	the	ESF-COST	High-
Level	Research	Conference	on	‘Understanding	
Extreme	Geohazards:	The	Science	of	the	Risk	
Management	Cycle’,	declare	the	need	that: 
•	A focused interdisciplinary research effort be 
made to increase our understanding of the nature 
of extreme geohazards and to improve our ability 
to assess their potential locations, intensity, and 
recurrence; 
Appendix C: Declaration on Extreme Geohazards and the Reduction  
of Disaster Risks 
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